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Abstract
We test the game-theoretic foundations of common-pool resources using an individual-level
dataset of groundwater usage that accounts for 3% of US irrigated agriculture. Using
necessary and sufficient revealed preference tests for dynamic games, we find: (i) a rejection of
the standard game-theoretic arguments based on strategic substitutes, and instead (ii) support
for models building on reciprocity-like behavior and strategic complements. By estimating
strategic interactions directly, we find that reciprocity-like interactions drive behavior more
than market and climate trends. Taken together, we take a step toward developing more
realistic models to understand groundwater usage, and related issues pertaining to tragedy
of the commons and commons governance.
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“For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed
on it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest,”
(Aristotle, Politics, Book II, Chapter 3),
“Nothing is more useful than water: but it will purchase scarce any thing; scarce
any thing can be had in exchange for it,” (Adam Smith,Wealth of Nations, 1776,
Book I, Chapter 4)
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
One of the biggest challenges facing the 21th century is sustaining natural resources in
the face of a growing global population and economy. Global resource extraction has more
than tripled since 1970, outpacing global population growth by 50% (International Resource
Panel (IRP), 2019). Since 2000, the growth rate in global resource extraction has matched the
global GDP growth rate. Looking forward, natural resource extraction is expected to double
by 2050 (see the same IRP 2019 report).
Of all the natural resources, groundwater—which is the focus of our own study—plays
a particularly important role in the sustenance of economic systems, and yet faces serious
depletion risks. More than 95% of usable and accessible freshwater is groundwater (Gleick
and Palaniappan, 2010), which makes it somewhat unsurprising that almost 80% of global
agriculture relies on groundwater irrigation (see UNESCO reports from 2009 and 2012).
The present rate of groundwater extraction, however, is unsustainable. Nearly every major
groundwater basin has been flagged as “depleting due to over-appropriation” (Gleeson et al.,
2012) because of irrigation, including Northern India, Southern California, and—the focus
of our own study—the American Midwest.1 Groundwater depletion has also been linked to
other problems such as climate change (Green et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 2013) and rising sea
levels (Konikow, 2011; Wada et al., 2012).
The central goal of this paper is to test two major, yet opposing, streams of research that
try to explain why groundwater levels are depleting at accelerating rates, despite the fact that
nobody wants groundwater to deplete.
1Groundwater-usage in the American Midwest (i.e., of the High Plains Aquifer) is a classic CPR case
study (Coman, 1911; Ostrom, 2011), illustrating the various challenges transitioning from collective access
investments initially to today’s risks of over-usage. See Gleick (2002, 2003), Foster and Chilton (2003),
Giordano (2009), Aeschbach-Hertig and Gleeson (2012), and Famiglietti (2014).
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The first major stream, which is the neoclassical, textbook answer in economic theory, is
commonly referred to as the “Tragedy of the Commons” (Lloyd, 1833; Gordon, 1954; Scott,
1955; Hardin, 1968). According to this hypothesis, the key issue is that a rational, self-
interested individual views resource sustainability as diametrically opposed to maximizing
profits. Any profit-maximizing user would extract resources until the marginal rate of return
equaled the marginal cost of extraction. One user extracting as such is seldom harmful
because the entire cost of depletion is borne. The problem, however, is when hundreds if not
thousands of users are all trying to maximize profit. If 99 out of 100 users are all pumping
groundwater sustainably, then the 1 can profit by pumping more groundwater while only
bearing 1/100th of the cost of depletion. All users thinking this way, the conclusion is that a
population using a resource strictly for profit will deplete the resource—hence the “Tragedy
of the Commons”. Inherent in this hypothesis is the divergence between individual and
collective rationality: nobody wants the resource to deplete, but it depletes nevertheless.2
The second, more ‘behavioral’ stream of research puts forward a very different story,
arguing that the self-interested forces are not the sole nor principal drivers of human behavior.
While the previous stream hypothesizes that sustainable pumping incentivizes unsustainable
pumping, this stream posits various mechanisms that all result in reciprocity-like behavior,
whereby sustainable pumping can incentivizes sustainable pumping. Frommore neoclassical
game theory, such mechanisms include non-cooperative collusion (Green and Porter, 1984;
Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986), social norms and conventions (Young, 1993; Burke and
Young, 2010; Young, 2015), and shared intentions (Newton, 2017). From behavioral and
experimental game theory, mechanisms include conditional cooperation (Fischbacher et al.,
2001), social preferences (Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006), interdependent preferences
(Sobel, 2005), interactive preferences (Levine, 1998; Nax et al., 2015), social pressuring
(Gaechter and Fehr, 1999; Masclet, 2003), and collective identities (Eckel and Grossman,
2005; Charness et al., 2007). Perhaps most notably, Ostrom (1990) asserted that reciprocity-
like patterns emerge because of local traditions, norms, values, social ties, etc.3
2In the relevant theory literature, CPR interactions are typically modeled as dynamic-stochastic games à la
Shapley (1953). For some prominent examples, see—in order of appearance—Levhari and Mirman (1980),
Reinganum and Stokey (1985), Clemhout and Wan (1985), Negri (1989), Dockner and Van Long (1993), Dutta
and Sundaram (1993), Clemhout and Wan (1993), Gaudet et al. (2001), Mirman and To (2005), Sorger (2005),
Wirl (2007, 2008), Koulovatianos (2015), and Jaskiewicz and Nowak (2015).
3See Ostrom (1965, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009) for some of her most relevant work in this
area. See Lara (2015) for an overview over Ostrom’s work and how her perspective on and use of game theory
evolved.
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The above disagreement between the neoclassical, textbook answer and more behavioral
answers can be interpreted as a debate between strategic substitutes versus complements. The
former asserts that sustainable behavior incentivizes unsustainable behavior—i.e. ground-
water usage decisions are strategic substitutes—and groundwater generally depletes. By
contrast, the latter asserts that sustainable behavior incentivizes sustainable behavior—i.e.
groundwater usage decisions are strategic complements—and groundwater levels can be sus-
tainable. This debate remains unsettled, particularly for the more general class of common-
pool resources (CPRs) under which groundwater falls, because of conflicting empirical
evidence. In a framed field experiment, Noussair et al. (2015) find that fishermen behave
in a way that is “consistent with standard economic theory that assumes selfish preferences
and non-cooperative behavior” (p. 413). Similar evidence was found in an experiment by
Stoop et al. (2012). By contrast, through experimental and survey data, Rustagi et al. (2010)
find evidence that “conditional cooperation and costly monitoring explain success in forest
commons management” (p. 961). Beyond the conflicting evidence, external validity concerns
have been voiced (Voors et al., 2011).
What continues to be missing is empirical evidence based on observational CPR data—
especially with groudnwater data—that circumvents external validity concerns and that can
delienate between strategic substitutes versus complements. We see two reasons why such
studies are missing until now. First, as is argued by Poteete and Ostrom (2008), there is
a lack of real-world data availability, and what is available lacks the detailed microscopic
(individual-level) information necessary to test the strategic foundations of CPR usage. This
is beginning to change as monitoring technologies have improved, which incidentally made
our study possible. Second—and we shall come back to this below—the appropriate test
procedures were not available until recently.
To date, most research on natural resources and the tragedy of the commons has focused
on fisheries, while groundwater has played a comparatively minor role in this discussion.
This is because, in part, fishery depletion was a serious issue in the years leading up to
and that followed Hardin’s (1968) popularization of the tragedy of the commons. Gordon
(1954), focusing almost exclusively on fisheries, is credited as the first to formulate the
tragedy of the commons as an economic model (see Banzhaf et al., 2018, who proposed a
revealed preference test for Gordon’s model). Smith (1969) advanced the economic theory of
natural resources using fisheries as the leading example. The seminal work by Levhari and
Mirman (1980), capitulating tragedy of the commons as a dynamic non-cooperative game,
was dedicated to fisheries. Fisheries have been the subject of many case studies (Jensen,
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2007), field experiments (Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Carpenter and Seki, 2011; Stoop et al.,
2012), framed field experiments (Noussair et al., 2015), and artefactual field experiments
(Torres-Guevara and Schlueter, 2016). Beyond theory and experiments, Huang and Smith
(2014) “conduct the first empirical investigation of common-pool resource users’ dynamic
and strategic behavior at the micro-level using real-world data”—and this data was from a
North Caroline fishery. These are but a few of the many economic studies on fisheries. In
the end, this literature has greatly contributed to the long-term economic viability of global
fisheries, as the policies developed therein “have been successful in some 150 major fisheries
of 170 species in seventeen countries ... Since 1986, the system has been effective, largely
eliminating overfishing, restoring stock to sustainable levels, and increasing fishermen’s
profits,” (Stavins, 2011, p. 91).
However, the success of fisheries have not been transferred to groundwater because, as
noted above, such data has not been available until recently. And much like the fishery
literature, studying the micro-behavior underlying groundwater usage can have far-reaching
policy implications, especially since strategic complements/substitutes result in starkly dif-
ferent policy recommendations. Based on the more neoclassical, textbook model, Hardin
(1968) claimed that only centralized authorities and private property institutions could sus-
tain CPRs in the long-run. By contrast, Ostrom (1990) built on strategic complements and
reciprocity-like behavior in order to advocate for policies that foster self-governance, local
norms, etc. While global groundwater depletion trends persist, there exists room to further
study which, if either, policy paradigm is most appropriate in the context of groundwater.
We return to this thought in the discussion section.
1.2. Main contributions
In this paper, with policymaking implications in mind, we take a critical look at the
strategic foundations of CPRs. We do so by analyzing a unique, individual-level dataset
of groundwater-usage from Nebraska, US—which sits on top of one of the world’s largest
groundwater reservoirs—that accounts for three percent of US irrigated agriculture. Ground-
water is renewable in the regions that we study, however, notable depletion exists. The dataset
documents farmer-level groundwater pumping and includes a rich set of control variables
including land-size, soil quality, longitude-latitude coordinates, climate data, market data,
as well as farmer-level information about whether groundwater recharges or depletes due to
pumping. Importantly, this dataset also describes farmer-level pumping in policy-free and
quota-policy areas, which gives us a somewhat unique opportunity to study how a policy can
change farmers’ behavioral incentives.
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As noted above, our central question is whether groundwater-usage decisions are strategic
substitutes or complements. We address this question, first by developing a new revealed
preference test for dynamic games, and second developing a new procedure for empirically
analyzing networked panel data.
Our revealed preference test pits both hypotheses against each other. We define two non-
parametric classes of “Groundwater Dynamic Games”, the first with strategic substitutes and
the second with strategic complements such that each postulates the exact opposite strategic
behavior. These games allow groundwater levels to dynamically evolve and farmers to plan
future farming seasons accordingly. Building on recent work by Carvajal et al. (2013), we
characterize both classes of dynamic games as revealed preference tests with a parametric,
simple, and easy-to-implement linear system of equations. Importantly, we show that these
tests can be used to study policy-free and quota-policy datasets, which allows us to compare
real-world behavior from both regions in an unbiased manner.
While the first test has the advantage of being non-parametric, it crucially relies on game-
theoretic arguments and thereby precludes the opportunity to test for more behavioral drivers
of groundwater pumping. Therefore, our second test complements the first by making explicit
parametric assumptions but avoiding any game-theoretic assumptions. By building on Mutl
and Pfaffermayr (2011), we pose the question of strategic substitutes versus complements
by incorporating a strategic interaction term into a regression framework. This allows us to
test for positive (or strategic complements) versus negative (or strategic substitutes) directly
while controlling for a range of possibly confounding factors. Importantly, we make a
methodological contribution by allowing the network that governs strategic interactions to be
unknown. This allows us to leverage our latitude-longitude data to test behavior under a wide
rage of possible mechanisms that could drive reciprocity-like behavior. Our test is assured to
be consistent and robust to endogeneity thanks to Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2011).
When applied to the dataset fromNebraska, both empirical tests point to the same answer:
we find a resounding rejection of the standard tragedy of the commons framework and, even
more surprisingly, strong evidence supporting models that build on reciprocity-like behavior,
i.e. models that asset behavior exactly contrary to what tragedy of the commons would
predict. Our findings also shed light on the influence of institutions on groundwater pumping
behavior. When we compare data from the policy-free and the policy region, it is clear that
introducing quota schemes renders farmers more likely to behave as if they are in a tragedy
of the commons situation. Taken together, we take a step toward developing more realistic
models to understand groundwater usage, and related questions regarding the tragedy of the
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commons and its governance.
1.3. Structure of the paper
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the various datasets used in
our analyses. In Section 3, we present a game-theoretic framework that forms the basis of our
analysis. Our revealed preference test and results are in Section 4. We empirically estimate
strategic interactions in Section 5. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
We have three appendices. Proofs are relegated to Appendix A. The estimation strategy
for our regression framework is provided in Appendix B. Robustness checks are reported in
Appendix C.
2. Our data
We study individual-level irrigation decisions from two districts above the High Plains
Aquifer (HPA) system (often referred to as the Ogallala Aquifer, which is actually just one of
the aquifers in the system). Our two districts lie in Nebraska, US. This dataset is rich on an
individual-level, which ultimately makes our test of game-theoretic foundations of tragedy of
the commons possible. But before we describe the dataset itself, we would like to describe
the context of the data in more detail.
2.1. Groundwater in the American Midwest
Nebraska (the “Cornhusker State”) is one of the key contributors to US agriculture, being
the number one red meat producer, second pinto bean producer, and third corn producer
among the US states as per 2014 (Nebraska Department of Agriculture, 2014). Nebraska’s
agricultural productivity also competes on a global scale, being the twelfth largest player
internationally in terms of irrigated land. Agriculture is the main economic activity in
Nebraska with farm-related income contributing over $23 billion (24% of Nebraska GDP in
2013) and a quarter of jobs coming from agriculture.
Nebraskan agriculture crucially relies on freshwater from the HPA, which stretches across
eight US states from southern South Dakota to northern Texas.4 Approximately 90% of
groundwater pumped from the HPA is used to irrigate crops. But like most other aquifers
around the world, the HPA is depleting due to over-pumping. Current estimates suggest that
15% of the aquifer has been depleted since the 1930s, and the current rate of depletion signals
4To give an idea of its size: if spread across the US, the HPA would cover all fifty states with 1.5ft of water
(https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-ogallala-aquifer/).
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Geographical distribution of farmers
Figure 1: Average water-per-acre usage in the (a) Upper Republican District from 2001–14 and (b) Upper Big
Blue District from 2007–2014. One inch = one inch of groundwater on top of one acre of land, which is 27,157
gallons.
that further decline in groundwater levels is likely (Haacker et al., 2016; Steward and Allen,
2016). Nebraska, with nearly two-thirds of all the groundwater from the HPA, is particularly
dependent on the HPA and particularly critical for its sustainability.5
2.2. Governing groundwater: Nebraska’s Natural Resources Districts
Groundwater has been at the heart of policymaking in the American Midwest for a long
time. But at first, policy makers struggled to incentivize farmers to pump groundwater
5The HPA is considered a renewable CPR in Nebraska, since snowmelt from the Rocky Mountains and
annual rainfall are, with moderate levels of pumping, sufficient to sustain groundwater levels.
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Groundwater depletion/recharge in the URD and UBB from 2007–14
Figure 2: Well-per-well change in water table levels (i.e. groundwater levels) from Spring 2017–14 in the (a)
Upper Republican District and (b) Upper Big Blue District.
because it was prohibitively costly to build and maintain irrigation wells. The first article
in the first issue of the AER, “Some Unsettled Problems of Irrigation” (Coman, 1911), was
dedicated to collective action problems associated with coordinating farmers to use irrigation
technologies. However, the situation changed fundamentally in the 1960s with the invention
of the center pivot irrigator, which made access to groundwater easier and cheaper. Center
pivot irrigation proliferated the number of farmers pumping groundwater from the HPA
for agricultural purposes (see fn. 8). Groundwater depletion was inevitable. In response
to depleting groundwater levels, in 1969 Nebraska founded 23 Natural Resources Districts
(NRDs) to govern groundwater pumping. In fact, each district has full jurisdiction over
governance of all natural resources within the district borders—which includes groundwater.
Since then, the NRDs have adopted very different policies to govern groundwater pumping,
and these differences play an important role in our empirical analysis below.
Our data concern individual-level groundwater-usage behavior in two of the 23 NRDs,
namely the “Upper Big Blue” NRD (UBB) and “Upper Republican” NRD (URD). Studying
the UBB and URD provides a somewhat unique opportunity to compare behavior in different
policy environments, as the UBB and URD adopted starkly different groundwater dynamics
and governance approaches.
The “Upper Big Blue” District — The UBB is the largest and most irrigated district in
Nebraska, alone accounting for 15% of Nebraska’s irrigated acres and 2% of the US’s
irrigated acres. Given the size, it is perhaps surprising that this district takes a policy-free
approach to regulating groundwater usage. Farmers pump groundwater without restrictions.
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The only regulatory measure taken by the UBB was requiring all farmers to install pumping
meters on irrigation wells in 2006. This is why the dataset begins in 2007, and we have data
through 2014.6
The “Upper Republican” District — The URD is roughly half the size of the UBB in terms
of groundwater irrigated land. Unlike the UBB, the URD was the first district in Nebraska to
introduce a quota policy to govern individual-level groundwater usage.7,8 This policy requires
farmers to pump less groundwater than a certain set quota over the course of five years (with
usage being monitored via pumping meters like in the UBB); farmers who fail to do so are
subject to a fine. The first quota was implemented from 1982–87, allowing farmers to pump
80” (=80” of groundwater per acre ≈ 2 million gallons). Since, this quota was decreased
in an attempt to chase declining groundwater levels: the quota was 75” for 1988–92, 72.5”
for 1993–97 and the two subsequent five year time windows, 67.5” for 2008–12, and 65” for
2013–17. Our data comprises the years 2001–14.9
2.3. Empirical regressors
Our empirical analysis utilizes data from different sources concerning (i) groundwater
usage collected by the UBB and the URD, (ii) groundwater depletion, soil types and other
controls collected by the University of Nebraska at Lincoln (UNL), (iii) market prices and
land rental rates from the US Department of Agriculture,10 (iv) and rain and temperature
from the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.11 Below, we categorize and
describe the key variables pertinent to our study.
Farmer’s groundwater usage — Our ‘main’ datasets are the annual UBB and URD records
concerning farmer-level groundwater usage. For each of the roughly 10,000+ farmers in the
UBB, we have data on total groundwater usage for each season from 2007–14, which amounts
6We would like to cordially thank Rod DeBuhr, Marie Krausnick, and Scott Snell at the UBB for permission
and access to UBB data, as well as conversations that have greatly contributed to our study.
7The US Geological Survey estimated that approximately 150 million acre-feet (=4.9×1013 gallons) of
renewable groundwater underlies the URD.
8In 1965, only 50,000 acres in the URD (or 3% of the URD) were being irrigated because of the sandier soil
that, without excessive pumping practices, were comparatively impractical to farm. With the proliferation of
center pivot irrigation in the late 1960s through the 1970s, this number increased by more than a quarter million
and plateaued to about 425,000 acres of irrigated cropland (Stephenson, 1996).
9We would like to express our gratitude to Nate Jenkins and Julia Franck at the URD for permission and




to nearly 100,000 observations. For each of the 3,000+ farmers in the URD, we have data on
the total groundwater usage for each season from 2001–14, which amounts to nearly 50,000
observations. Data include (i) latitude-longitude coordinates of farmers’ farmland and (ii)
the number of acres the groundwater serviced. We plot the spatial location of farmers in the
UBB and URD in Figure 1; black-white shading represents the average groundwater usage
of each farmer.
Neighbors — Because the dataset includes latitude-longitude coordinates, we have the op-
portunity to account for the networked strategic interactions of groundwater usage. In other
words, we have a way to control for with whom a farmer interacts strategically. There are
four reasons we shall emphasize a farmer’s neighbors as those who play an important role
in strategic interactions. First, neighbors are a natural starting point as farmers are more
likely to observe, communicate and strategically interact in close proximity than with more
distant farmers. Second, the importance of locality was also emphasized by UBB farmers in
qualitative interviews we made in 2015. Third, and in line with Ostrom’s local governance
principles, informal institutions—such as moral and social norms—operate on a local level.
Finally, there are so-called “local drawdown” effects (Theis, 1941; Cooper and Jacob, 1946;
Spalding and Khaleel, 1991) operating at the hydrological level. Local drawdown is caused
by pumps drawing ‘local’ groundwater in close proximity first, which causes local deple-
tion of neighbors’ groundwater-levels—season-long pumping gradually increases the set of
neighbors on whom a farmer induces local drawdown. The hydrology literature typically
defines a “radius of influence” in which local drawdown is measurable by the end of the
farming season, which ranges from 200ft to a mile (Cashman and Preene, 2001).
Groundwater dynamics — The HPA is a so-called “water table aquifer” because there exists
a clear “upper-boundary” of the aquifer—often referred to as the water table level—that
moves closer to the surface-level if the resource is recharging and further away if the resource
is depleting (Gutentag et al., 1984; McGuire et al., 2003). We follow geologists, hydrologists
and government officials in using water tables as proxies for depletion risks. Researchers at
UNL kindly provided us with relevant data for UBB and URD for our years of interest.12 The
data include measurements at more than 500 locations in the UBB and URD, time-stamped
as Spring or Fall, which allows us to empirically track groundwater depletion within season,
as well as resource recharge between seasons. Based on this data, we use standard spatial
12We are grateful to Dana Divine and Aaron Young for helping us include this data in our anlayses.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, 2008–12. GW = groundwater.
Panel A Upper Big Blue District Upper Republican District
(2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012)
Number of observations 10,375 10,546 10,435 10,426 10,714 3,209 3,209 3,209 3,209 3,209
GW-usageti 5.79 8.27 6.38 5.85 13.81 12.07 9.53 10.72 10.18 19.04
(GW-usageti SD) (4.2) (5.1) (4.3) (4.1) (6.9) (4.01) (4.12) (4.09) (4.19) (5.49)
Groundwater control variables
Spring GWti (ft) 81.18 81.89 81.98 81.68 82.00 113.6 114.39 115.61 114.47 111.91
(Spring GWti SD) (12.2) (12.3) (12.2) (12.6) (11.9) (37.9) (37.8) (39.6) (38.8) (36.4)
Fall GWti (ft) 82.89 82.67 80.70 78.47 84.58 117.97 117.62 112.64 110.56 108.49
(Fall GWti SD) (9.8) (8.5) (8.6) (8.8) (7.5) (40.33) (39.6) (23.1) (26.3) (20.9)
Annual control variables
Price of cornt ($ / bushel) 5.65 3.55 3.68 7.17 7.17 5.65 3.55 3.68 7.17 7.17
Electricityt (¢ / kW-hr) 11.26 11.51 11.54 11.72 11.88 11.26 11.51 11.54 11.72 11.88
Raint (in) 16.24 13.85 18.54 22.33 6.52 11.13 14.42 14.08 13.36 4.38
Temperaturet (◦F) 71.48 68.45 71.08 71.03 72.60 66.57 66.23 67.87 67.97 72.89
Farmland rental ratestC ($ / acre) 170.5 173.5 180.6 197.9 243.8 168.96 141.87 161.45 173.15 191.08
(Rental ratetC–SD) (8.2) (8.2) (8.6) (9.4) (18.6) (30.2) (14.2) (21.3) (17.2) (24.7)
Panel B Upper Big Blue District Upper Republican District
(mean) (SD) (range) (mean) (SD) (range)
Farm control variables
Land-sizei (acres) 101.51 35.72 [3.0 , 349.0] 141.0 57.5 [2.0, 702.9]
Well Depthi (ft) 184.82 31.93 [5.0, 470.0] 248.2 74.2 [22.0, 552.0]
Transmissivityi (ft3) 126.34 36.25 [1.66, 249.3] 106.5 3.82 [94.8, 112.4]
interpolation methods to estimate groundwater levels in the Spring and Fall of every season
at every location in the dataset.13
Control variables — The UNL dataset also records depths of wells, and we use the same
spatial interpolation method noted above to estimate the well depth for each farmer. Other,
separate datasets from the UNL allow us to use similar procedures to obtain controls for
transmissivity14 and soil types. We add to these datasets by including seasonal rain and
13More specifically, we utilize a method called “kriging”; see Krige (1951), and Matheron (1963) for
the seminal texts and von Stein (2012) for a modern treatment. Under reasonable assumptions, this method
provides the best linear unbiased prediction of geo-spatial intermediate values that maintains geologically
relevant properties, such as continuity of the water table.
14Transmissivity is a metric for how fast groundwater moves across the groundwater basin. Importantly, as a
farmer irrigates, higher transmissivity implies the basin ‘replaces’ faster and alleviates the stress on water table
levels during pumping, which helps stabilizes groundwater levels. Hence, farmers with higher transmissivity
are less prone to receding water table levels.
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temperature (sum and average from April to September, respectively) from data by the
US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Finally, we include three market
variables from the US Department of Agriculture: (i) average spot market price of corn from
April 1st to October 1st of each season (we focus on corn because, in a typical year, roughly
70% of irrigated land is for corn), (ii) average price of electricity between April and October,
and (iii) farmland rental rates which are available averaged at the county level each season
(there are nine counties in the UBB and three in the URD).
Summary — In total, our final dataset consists of approximately 100,000 observations of
farmer-level groundwater usage in the UBB and 50,000 observations in the URD, as well as
a rich set of controls concerning resource dynamics, farmer attributes, seasonal attributes,
and market conditions. We summarize the datasets from 2008–12 in Table 1, which contains
a complete five year quota period for the URD.
3. Rationalizing data with dynamic games
In this section, we present our framework for studying groundwater usage as a dynamic
game. We introduce a class of games that subsumes both policy-free and quota policy
environments. Our model builds on Negri (1989), while also taking into account some of the
key features of the UBB and the URD. Each dynamic game consists of four ingredients:
(Section 3.1.1) The revenue associated with selling crops.
(Section 3.1.2) Intra-seasonal groundwater depletion due to pumping.
(Section 3.1.3) The cost of pumping groundwater.
(Section 3.1.4) The ‘dynamic’ inter-seasonal aspects, i.e. how farmers view groundwater-
usage ‘today’ affects strategic behavior and profits in the future.
Next, we introduce these four components formally. Definitions are in bold. For notation,
we let R+ = [0,+∞) and R++ = (0,+∞).
3.1. Groundwater dynamic games
Consider a set of farmers N = {1, 2, . . . ,N} producing (possibly different) crops during
each season {1, 2, . . . ,T } = T . Each farmer i ∈ N is characterized by a land-size li ∈ R++. For
every t ∈ T , farmers plant crops in spring and harvest in the late summer, and in between pump
groundwater in order to increase crop yield (or total supply that can be sold after harvest). We
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denote farmer i’s action space in season t ∈ T asWi = R+. An element wti ∈ Wi represents
groundwater usage-per-acre (this is the unit in Figure 1), and liwti represents the total volume
of groundwater pumped.
3.1.1. Revenue
Farmers make profits in various ways. They can either sell at the spot market (at possibly
different prices in October, November or December) or on the futures market. Alternatively,
farmers can store crops in long-term storage facilities (e.g. for raising cattle or selling later
on). To capture these diverse revenue streams, we define a revenue function Rti :Wi → R+,
which may be both farmer- and season-dependent, thus controling for different yield and sale
strategies across farmers and price changes across seasons. In order to be able to work with
this function, we assume that Rti is absolutely continuous and concave in wti.
3.1.2. Intra-season groundwater depletion
Groundwater usage and recharge determine the evolution of the resource. Here, we first
focus on how groundwater levels change during the season as a result of farmers pumping.
For farmer i ∈ N in season t ∈ T , we denote gt,Springi ∈ R+ as the distance between the water
table level and wellhead in the spring. We denote gt,Falli ∈ R+ as this distance when farmers
stop pumping (i.e. at the beginning of harvest). Two dynamics determine gt,Falli .
The first is due to aquifer-wide groundwater withdrawals, W t =
∑
i∈N li(wti − rt), where
depletion is offset by recharge from rain, rt ∈ R++. We defineG : R→ R as a global depletion
function, which we assume is (i) absolutely continuous and nondecreasing in W t − rt and (ii)
slowly changing in individual groundwater-usage (i.e. ∂
∂w j
G ≈ 0 for any j ∈ N).15 We then
let gt,Springi + G(W t − rt) represent the decline/recharge of i’s groundwater level that is caused
by aquifer-wide groundwater withdrawals.
The second type of change is a local, heterogeneous depletion called local drawdown (see
Section 2). Let Ni ⊆ N\{i} denote the set of farmers inducing local drawdown on farmer i.




j. We define Li : R+ → R+ as a
local drawdown function, which is assumed to be absolutely continuous and nondecreasing
in wtNi + liw
t
i. We then let g
t,Spring
i +Li(wtNi + liwti) represent the local decline in i’s groundwater
level due to local drawdown.
A farmer’s groundwater level at the start of harvest is the result of local and global
15The latter is a somewhat innocuous assumption since a single farmer represents ∼0.008% (0.03%) of the
UBB (URD) farming population.
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depletion:
∀i, t : gt,Falli (wti,wt−i)︸          ︷︷          ︸
Fall level
= gt,Springi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spring level
+ G(W t − rt)︸      ︷︷      ︸
Global depletion
+Li(wtNi + liwti)︸           ︷︷           ︸
Local drawdown
. (1)
3.1.3. Cost of pumping groundwater
The cost of pumping groundwater is proportional to the distance between water table and
the pump wellhead, which is increasing as farmers pump. We capture the costs that accrue
from a changing pumping distance through










where ei > 0 is the farmer-specific energy cost of pumping, which takes into account whether
the farmer has a diesel or electricity pump, the age of the pump, etc. The interpretation of (2)
is that, taking other farmers’ groundwater usage as given, a farmer accounts for self-imposed
costs associated with his/her own contribution to the depletion he/she experiences.
3.1.4. Future strategies and payoffs
Future strategies — We suppose that every farmer i is forward-looking and strategizes to
maximize current and future payoffs in seasons τ ∈ {t + 1, t + 2, . . . ,T }. Let Zτi represent the
set of possible information i could have at the beginning of season τ, which may include, for
example, realized prices, realized groundwater levels (gτ,S pringi , g
τ,S pring
−i ), and past information.
Farmers use this information to decide not only how much groundwater to pump, but also
which crops to plant, whether to buy insurance, etc. To capture such decisions, we let
ατi : Z
τ
i → Aτi represent a contingency strategy, where Aτi is the set of all possible such
decisions. Let Aτi = {ατi : Zτi → Aτi } be the set of possible contingency strategies and
ατ = (ατ1, . . . , α
τ
N) ∈ × j∈NAτj = Aτ.16 For notation, we let Xi = ×τ∈{t+1,t+2,...,T }Aτi . A profile of
such strategies is denoted as x = (x1, . . . , xN) ∈ × j∈NX j = X.
Net-present value — Farmer i’s realized payoff in season τ ∈ {t + 1, t + 2, . . . ,T } depends
on all farmers’ (realized) contingency strategies. We denote Pτi : Aτ → R as i’s payoff in
season τ, which depends on the realization of information:
(zτ1, z
τ
2, . . . , z
τ
N) = z
τ 7→ Pτi (ατ(zτ)).
16Note that any ατi ∈ Aτi may be a Markovian or non-Markovian strategy.
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From i’s perspective, realized information zτ is dependent on what happens in season t. As
such, we let zτ ∼ Pτi
(






where we let ιti represent all relevant
information i has to deduce the distribution of zτ. We assume that {Pt+1i ,Pt+2i , . . . ,PTi } admits
a well defined expectation over the realization (zt+1, zt+2, . . . , zT ).
A farmer i’s net-present value, dependent on current pumping and future contingency
strategies equals






≡ Rti(wti) − Cti(wti,wt−i)︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
Profit in season t
+ F ti (wti,wt−i; x)︸          ︷︷          ︸
Discounted sum of future profit
where δi ∈ (0, 1) is i’s discount factor. We refer to F ti (·) as i’s future profit function.
We impose two assumptions on F ti . First, we assume that future profit is absolutely
continuous and concave in wti for each wt−i (concavity here means that the marginal self-
imposed cost of depletion is decreasing). Thismeans that, for any given (wt−i, x−i) ∈ W−i×X−i,
the set of possible contingency strategies is restricted to X̂i(wt−i, x−i) ⊆ Xi such that each
x̂i ∈ X̂i(wt−i, x−i) renders F ti (wti,wt−i; x̂i, x−i) absolutely continuous and concave in wti. Second,
we assume that i only picks optimal strategies within this restricted set. This means that each





−i, x−i) ∈ arg max
x̂i∈X̂i(wt−i,x−i)
Pti(wti,wt−i; x̂i, x−i).
Assuming all players act this way, we can reduce the net-present value function in the
following way:
Pti(wti,wt−i; x̂∗) = Rti(wti) − Cti(wti,wt−i) + F ti (wti,wt−i; x̂∗(wti,wt−i))
≡ Pti(wti,wt−i) = Rti(wti) − Cti(wti,wt−i) + F ti (wti,wt−i).
(3)
The latter equation in (3) gives us a succinct way to capture how farmers view groundwater
usage in season t as impacting profits in season {t + 1, t + 2, . . . ,T }.
3.1.5. Definition of groundwater dynamic games
Having described the model ingredients and assumptions, we can now define a ground-
water dynamic game formally.
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Definition 1. A groundwater (GW) dynamic game consists of revenue functions (Rti)(i,t)∈N×T ,
a global depletion function G, local drawdown functions (Li)i∈N , energy costs (ei)i∈N , and
future profit functions (F ti )(i,t)∈N×T , which, together, form a non-cooperative game at each
time period:
{N , (Wi,Pti )i∈N }t∈T .
3.2. Integrating a quota policy
Since one of our datasets is from a district (the URD) where a specific quota policy exists,
it is worth considering how such an environment could fit into the class of GW dynamic
games. The type of quota policies considered here work as follows. Going into a quota
period, the URD first estimates the total amount of groundwater usage that can be withdrawn
sustainably, which determines the overall quota. Each farmer can then pump up to his/her
share of that quota over the span of T -years, where T = 5 for the URD. If any farmer uses
more (less) than his/her quota by X amount, then his/her quota is reduced (increased) by X
during the next quota period.
To see how such a quota policy fits into a GW dynamic game, consider t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5}.
First note that, because the quota has no immediate impact on profits, we can relegate the
strategic consequences of the quota to the future profit function. That is, the net-present value
of a farmer pumping groundwater under a quota policy is given as
Pti(wti,wt−i) = Rti(wti) − Cti(wti,wt−i) + F ti (wti,wt−i | wti,wt−1i , . . . ,w1i )
≡ Rti(wti) − Cti(wti,wt−i) + F ti (wti,wt−i)
(4)
where (wti,wt−1i , . . . ,w1i ) added to F ti reflects the future consequences of using more/less
than the quota. The second line of (4) follows by treating past decisions, (wτ−1i , . . . ,w1i ),
as exogenous variables. This means that such terms can be incorporated into F ti via the
superscript t.
The main takeaway is that a quota policy can be subsumed directly by the class of
GW dynamic games defined above because the assumptions underlying such games are also
satisfied by environments with a quota policy. This feature shall play an important role in
our subsequent analysis.
3.3. GW dynamic games can rationalize any dataset
We have taken considerable care to define our model as generally as possible and to not
depend on arbitrary parameterizations. Compared with the only prior use of a revealted
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preference test procedure by Banzhaf et al. (2018) in a CPR setting, we add substantial
generality and realism by introducing a dynamic dimension to the problem, which in our
view is central to modeling the use of groundwater.
This begs the following question: can GW dynamic games account for real-world
groundwater-usage behavior? This question amounts to asking whether any GW dynamic
game can predict the behavior we observe in the UBB and/or URD. Given the size and
permisiveness of the class of GW dynamic games defined above, it is perhaps unsurprising
to find that the answer is ‘yes’.
We address this question by identifying a revealed preference test for GW dynamic games.
This test and the results that follow form the basis of our analyses in the following section.
Dataset — Our goal is to show that GW dynamic games can explain datasets. A dataset
concerns farmers N = {1, 2, . . . ,N} in seasons T = {1, 2, . . . ,T }. For each season, each
farmer’s groundwater usage (wti)(i,t)∈N×T ∈ RNT++ is observed. Several control variables are
also observed, including farmers’ land-size (li)i∈N ∈ RN++, groundwater levels at the beginning










Rationalizability — We say that a GW dynamic game can rationalize a dataset if the Nash
equilibrium of the GW dynamic game coincides with observed behavior. We formalize this
notion in the following definition.
Definition 2. A dataset O = {wti, li, gt,Springi , rt}(i,t)∈N×T is rationalizable if there exists a GW
dynamic game such that, for each i ∈ N and t ∈ T ,
wti ∈ arg max
xi∈Wi
Pti(xi,wt−i).
In other words, rationalizability says that, at each observation t, each farmer i’s ob-
served groundwater usage maximizes net-present value given the groundwater usage of other
farmers.
A characterization of rationalizability — It turns out that rationalizability of a dataset is
characterized by a linear program, which we call the GW program.
Definition 3. For a dataset O , there exists a solution to the GW program if and only if there
are positive numbers { f̂ ti , λ̂ti}(i,t)∈N×T that satisfy the following three conditions:
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(CGD) Common global depletion,
∀i, j, t : f̂ ti − λ̂ti − gt,Springi = f̂ tj − λ̂tj − gt,Springj ;
(MGD) Monotone global depletion,
∀i, s, t : W s − rs > (=) W t − rt =⇒ f̂ si − λ̂si − gs,Springi > (=) f̂ ti − λ̂ti − gt,Springi ;
(MLD) Monotone local depletion,
∀i, s, t : wsNi + liwsi > (=) wtNi + liwti =⇒ λ̂si − λ̂ti > (=) 0.
The logic of the GW program works as follows. First, a dataset O plugs into the system
of linear equations above to create the GW program. Second, the GW program works by
identifying positive numbers { f̂ ti , λ̂ti}(i,t)∈N×T that solve the system of linear equations—if such
coefficients exist. It turns out that the existence of a solution to this system provides the key
to determining whether or not GW dynamic games can rationalize UBB and/or URD data.
The following theorem is the first theoretical contribution of this paper, which shows that
the GW program is necessary and sufficient for rationalizing a dataset with a GW dynamic
game.
Theorem 1. The following sentences about O are equivalent:
(A) There exists a solution to the GW program defined by O .
(B) O is rationalizable by a GW dynamic game.
In other words, Theorem 1 provides a non-parametric test that works as follows: (suffi-
ciency) if there is a solution to the GW program, then there is at least one GW dynamic game,
policy-free or with a quota policy, that can rationalize a dataset; (necessity) if there does not
exist a solution to the GW program, then no GW dynamic game can rationalize the dataset
of interest. This means that, by virtue of being necessary and sufficient, studying the GW
program is equivalent to studying whether we can account for behavior in the UBB and/or
URD using a GW dynamic game.
The proof of Theorem 1 clarifies what each part of the GW program represents. (CGD)
represents the assumption that farmers are optimizing profits whilst drawing from a common
resource (hence the = sign). (MGD) is derived from the assumption that global depletion
is nondecreasing in aquifer-wide groundwater withdrawals. Finally, (MLD) represents the
assumption that local drawdown is nondecreasing in local groundwater-usage.
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There are two somewhat surprising features of Theorem 1. First, we find that the
non-parametric class of GW dynamic games is characterized by a parametric, simple, and
easy-to-implement linear system of equations. Second, we find that the same test can be used
to study policy-free datasets and quota policy datasets. This means that we have a somewhat
unique opportunity to compare strategic behavior in policy-free vs. policy regions in an
unbiased manner.
Rationalizing behavior in the UBB andURD – Bymeans of Theorem 1 and the GWprogram,
it is relatively straightforward to show that any dataset can be rationalized with a GWdynamic
game. Consider some arbitrary O . For all i, j ∈ N and s, t ∈ T , let λ̂si = λ̂ti = λ̂tj = λ∗—this
means that (MLD) is always satisfied. For all i ∈ N and t ∈ T , let f̂ ti = gt,Springi . Consequently,
f̂ ti − λ̂ti − gt,Springi = λ∗ for every i ∈ N and t ∈ T , which means that (CGD) and (MGD) are
always satisfied. Taken together, a solution to the GW program always exists for any dataset.
It thus follows from Theorem 1 that both the UBB and URD datasets are rationalizable via
a GW dynamic game. This observation is perhaps unsurprising as it reflects the many folk
theorems that exist for these types of games (Friedman, 1971; Aumann and Shapley, 1994;
Dutta, 1995).
We summarize this observation in the following corrollary.
Corollary 1. Any dataset O is rationalizable by a GW dynamic game.
Although GW dynamic games as stated above do not have any testable predictions, there
are two advantages of using this framework as a starting point. First, we assure ourselves
of studying a sufficiently general class of models that can explain UBB and URD behavior.
Second, this generality helps clarify the role of any additional assumptions we impose on GW
dynamic games below for our purpose of testing strategic substitutes versus complements.
4. Revealed preference test of strategic behavior
In this section, we investigate whether farmers behave in a way that standard tragedy-
of-the-commons theory would anticipate, and, if not, what type of behavior describes
groundwater-usage.
We now turn to our groundwater data to identify what kinds of game-theoretic models fit
the observed groundwater usages. In particular, our focus is on identifying whether games
exhibiting strategic substitutability or strategic complementarity are able to rationalize our
data. We will formulate two null hypotheses to represent these two classes of models.
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Our first null hypothesis builds on standard CPR game theory, where one of the main
takeaways is the strategic behavior implicated by the mismatch between individual and
collective interests. It is in the farmers’ interest to sustain groundwater. But if a farmer
observes that neighbors are pumping at a sustainable rate, then this farmers has the individual
incentive to over-pump—or pump unsustainably—in order to maximize profits. In other
words, sustainable pumping incentivizes an individual to do the exact opposite—hence the
mismatch. This is called strategic substitutes.
Our second hypothesis draws from several which assumes that farmers’ individual interest
is mismatched with farmers’ collective interest. This assumption suggests that sustainable
behavior incentivizes unsustainable behavior—or groundwater pumping decisions are strate-
gic substitutes. The second hypothesis asserts the opposite, namely strategic complements.
See the introduction for a long list of game theory, behavioral game theory, and empirical
studies that put forward different mechanisms that lead to strategic complements.
Our second null hypothesis draws from several strands of literature that explores mech-
anisms whereby farmers’ decisions are not strategic substitutes, but strategic complements.
These mechanisms are from game theory (e.g. Green and Porter, 1984), behavioral game
theory (e.g. Fischbacher et al., 2001), and empirical work (e.g., Ostrom, 1990)—see the
introduction for a more extensive list. These mechanisms all share the common feature that
sustainable pumping incentivizes sustainable pumping, i.e., decisions are strategic comple-
ments.
In sum, our hypotheses are as follows:
First null hypothesis, H S UBS0 : Farmers’ groundwater-usage decisions are strate-
gic substitutes.
Second null hypothesis, H COMP0 : Farmers’ groundwater-usage decisions are
strategic complements.
Alternative hypothesis, HA: Farmers’ groundwater-usage decisions are neither
strategic substitutes nor complements.
In this section, we pose our null hypotheses as revealed preference tests. We do so
in two steps. First, we incorporate strategic substitutes and complements into the class of
GW dynamic games defined above. Second, we identify linear programs that are neces-
sary and sufficient for checking whether there exists any GW dynamic game with strategic
substitutes/complements that can rationalize our data. We conclude by presenting empirical
results. In the end, our main finding is a resounding rejection of our first null hypothesis—i.e.
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a rejection of what standard CPR game theory would predict—and considerable evidence in
favor or reciprocity-like behavior as a means of explaining groundwater-usage in the UBB
and URD.
4.1. Strategic substitutes vs. complements
In order to pose our null hypotheses as revealed preference tests, we first must clarify
what strategic substitutes and complements means. Following Bulow et al. (1985), strategic
substitutes and complements are defined according to marginal cost. We say i’s and Ni’s
pumping decisions are strategic substitutes (complements) if a decrease in wtNi increases
(decreases) i’s marginal cost of pumping. The comparative statics consequence is that, ifNi
decreases groundwater-usage, then i has the incentive to free-ride (reciprocate) by increasing
(decreasing) groundwater-usage (we formalize this comparative statics observation in fn. 17).
Equivalently, strategic substitutes (complements) can be defined in terms of submodu-
larity (supermodularity). We say that Pti is submodular (supermodular) in (wti,wtNi) if ceteris
paribus wtNi > w
t





Marginal gain/cost of pumping more GW at wtNi︷                           ︸︸                           ︷
Pti(wti,wtNi) − Pti(wti, wtNi) ≤ (≥)
Marginal gain/cost of pumping more GW at wtNi︷                           ︸︸                           ︷
Pti(wti,wtNi) − Pti(wti,wtNi).
Submodularity (supermodularity)means that decreasingwtNi increases (decreases) i’smarginal
cost of pumping.17
We incorporate strategic substitutes and complements in GW dynamic games in the
following way.
Definition 4. A tuple {N , (Wi,Pti )i∈N }t∈T is a GW dynamic game with strategic substitutes
(complements) if, for every i ∈ N and t ∈ T :
(i) Rti(wti) ≡ Ri(wti) and F ti (wti,wt−i) ≡ Fi(wti,wtNi);
(ii) Pti is submodular (supermodular) in (wti,wtNi).
As discussed above, the second assumption distinguishes between strategic substitutes
and complements.
17If Pti is submodular (supermodular) in (wti,wtNi ), it follows from (e.g.) Quah and Strulovici (2009, Proposi-
tion 2) that wtNi > w
t
Ni =⇒ arg maxxi∈Wi Pti(xi,w
t
Ni ) is less (greater) than arg maxxi∈Wi Pti(xi,wtNi ) by the strong
set order (for more details see, e.g., Topkis, 1978, and Milgrom and Shannon, 1994).
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The first assumption is needed to derive meaningful revealed preference tests. The
first part of this assumption asserts that revenue and future profits functions are the same
across seasons. This is obviously a strong condition, and its consequences are clear in the
final results—however, we can somewhat attenuate this condition with our test procedure
described below. The second part of this assumption, F ti (wti,wt−i) ≡ Fi(wti,wtNi), asserts that
neighbors’ behavior is sufficient to formulate future profits. This can be viewed as a condition
that emphasizes the importance of locality for groundwater-usage decisions (and, it turns out,
this condition is particularly important for deriving the revealed preference tests below).
4.2. A test based on revealed preferences
Our test of the null hypotheses is based on Definition 4. We are interested in whether
strategic substitutes—H S UBS0 —and/or strategic complements—H
COMP
0 —can characterize
real-world behavior. The test procedure is similar to Section 3.3. We find evidence in favor
of (against) H S UBS0 if, for a given dataset O , we can (cannot) find a GW dynamic game with
strategic substitutes that can rationalizeO (see Definition 2 for the definition of ‘rationalize’).
We find evidence in favor of (against) H COMP0 if, for a given dataset O , we can (cannot) find
a GW dynamic game with strategic complements that can rationalize O .
Similar to Theorem 1, we operationalize our test procedure by means of a linear program,
which builds directly on the GW program (see Definition 3).
Definition 5. For a dataset O , consider the following equations:
(SUBS) Strategic substitutes,
∀i, s, t : wsi < wti and wsNi < wtNi =⇒ ( f̂ si − λ̂si ) − ( f̂ ti − λ̂ti) ≤ 0;
(COMP) Strategic complements,
∀i, s, t : wsi < wti and wsNi > wtNi =⇒ ( f̂ si − λ̂si ) − ( f̂ ti − λ̂ti) ≤ 0.
There exists a solution to the GW program with strategic substitutes if and only if there are
nonnegative numbers { f̂ ti , λ̂ti}(i,t)∈N×T that satisfy (CGD, MGD, MLD) and (SUBS).
There exists a solution to the GW program with strategic complements if and only if
there are nonnegative numbers { f̂ ti , λ̂ti}(i,t)∈N×T that satisfy (CGD, MGD, MLD) and (SUBS).
The following theorem is the second main theoretical contribution of this paper, which
shows that the GW program with strategic substitutes (complements) is a necessary and
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sufficient for rationalizing a dataset with a GW dynamic game with strategic substitutes
(complements).
Theorem 2. The following sentences about O are equivalent:
(C) There exists a solution to the GW program with strategic substitutes (complements)
defined by O .
(D) O is rationalizable by a GW dynamic game with strategic substitutes (complements).
Similar to above, Theorem 2 provides a straightforward way of testing whether farmers’
behavior exhibit strategic substitutes vs. complements. This test is nonparametric, simple,
and easy to implement as a system of linear equations. In addition, we can employ this test
on both UBB and URD data, which provides us with an unbiased way of comparing behavior
in a policy-free vs. policy region.
4.3. Test setup
In implementing the GW program, testing all UBB and URD data at the same time with
a somewhat unforgiving revealed preference test is perhaps not the most informative test. We
are trying to account for nearly 15,000 farmers and 100,000 decisions. If a single farmer
is acting ‘irrationally’ or a single decision is ‘irrational’, then the test will fail and we loose
information about how the remaining N − 1 farmers are behaving. This is one of several
issues we can overcome by taking a more nuanced testing approach.
Following Carvajal et al. (2013) and Banzhaf et al. (2018), we run the GW program
on subsets of UBB and URD data, with each subset consisting of {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8} farmers
over {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8} consecutive seasons. It follows from Theorem 2 that the GW program
with strategic substitutes (complements) is necessary and sufficient for any subset of the
data to be rationalized by a GW dynamic game with strategic substitutes (complements).
We also restrict attention to {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8} farmers who are mutual neighbors.18 This is
because our goal is to test farmers who are likely to view each others’ actions as strategically
interdependent—this argument is more compelling for farmers in a one mile proximity rather
than, e.g. a thirty mile proximity.
As noted above, there are several advantages to testing subsets of our data, rather than
the entire dataset. First, we exclude the possibility that the GW program is rejected because
18Operationally, we do so by randomly selecting i, recovering his/her closest {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7} neighbors, and
then running the GW program on these farmers.
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a few farmers are not responding optimally to others. Second, running the test on subsets
of the data mitigates errors that might result from unobserved variable bias. It is very likely
that idiosyncratic shocks impact farmers’ behavior during the season, such as the mechanical
failure of a center pivot irrigator, which may render behavior as seemingly irrational. Third,
we rule out the possibility of spurious rejection rates due to farmers learning and innovating
to improve their farming practices between seasons. Such learning can change a farmer’s
revenue function and/or cost function over time, which is a process that is not captured by the
class of GW dynamic games presented above. Looking at smaller samples with short time
scales addresses this issue. Finally, as is made clear below, we demonstrate the ability of the
test to reject behavior on a small number of observations notwithstanding the permissiveness
of our non-parametric framework.
Unlike Carvajal et al. (2013) and Banzhaf et al. (2018), the size of our dataset renders
it computationally impossible to sample over the 4.7 trillion farmer pairs, 3.7×1018 farmer
quadruplets, let alone each consecutive time sequence. We thus randomly sample subsets of
our data, run the GW program on each such subset, and record the percentage of cases with
a solution to the corresponding GW program—we call this the acceptance rate. In doing so,
we can leverage the law of large numbers and randomly sample until we reach a convergence
in the rejection rate (in practice, running the GW program on 1,000 random sub-samples is
sufficient).
4.4. Results
Upper Big Blue District — Following Hardin (1968), we might anticipate that groundwater-
usage behavior are strategic substitutes in the UBB because farmers operate in an unrestricted
and ungoverned manner. Without such restrictions, the incentives to avoid the tragedy of the
commons are, in theory, absent.
We report results using theUBBdataset in Table 2. Each reported number is an acceptance
rate, and it is interpreted as the probability of sampling a subset of farmers whose behavior
is rationalizable by a GW dynamic game with (Panel A) strategic substitutes or (Panel B)
strategic complements. Two patterns in Table 2 are perhaps unsurprising. First, acceptance
rates are decreasing in the number of farmers. This is unsurprising because, if a dataset
consisting of (e.g.) five farmers over three years passes the GW program test, then any subset
of this dataset involving four or less farmers over a shorter time window will also pass the
GW program test. Second, acceptance rates are decreasing with the time window. This is
unsurprising because of the season-independence assumption made in the definition of GW
dynamic games with strategic substitutes/complements.
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Table 2: Upper Big Blue District — Acceptance rates of the GW program with (Panel A) strategic substitutes
and (Panel B) strategic complements (sub-sample = 1,000).
Panel A – Strategic substitutes Number of farmers (N)
2 3 4 5 6 8
Years (T ) T = 2 0.63 0.56 0.52 0.44 0.39 0.30
T = 3 0.23 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.05
T = 4 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.01 0 0
T = 5 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0
T = 6 0 0 0 0 0 0
T = 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel B – Strategic complements Number of farmers (N)
2 3 4 5 6 8
Years (T ) T = 2 0.90 0.87 0.84 0.82 0.75 0.74
T = 3 0.73 0.70 0.61 0.57 0.51 0.4
T = 4 0.66 0.50 0.40 0.35 0.28 0.24
T = 5 0.52 0.33 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.20
T = 6 0.37 0.23 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.02
T = 8 0.12 0.04 0.01 0 0 0
The results in Table 2 point to strong evidence against strategic substitutes and in favor of
strategic complements. We find that the GW program with strategic substitutes exhibit low
acceptance rates: as soon as the number of farmers exceeds four (which is less than 0.05%
of the UBB population) and for sufficiently long time windows, the data systematically reject
the possibility of finding a GW dynamic game with strategic substitutes that can rationalize
behavior in the UBB. This is in stark contrast to the strong pattern of high acceptance rates
we find with the GW program with strategic complements. For example, for T = 2 and
N = 8, we find that 44% more data can be explained with GW dynamic games with strategic
complements than with strategic substitutes.
Table 2 reports absolute acceptance rates. It turns out that looking at our results from
the perspective of relative acceptance rates further highlights the explanatory power of GW
dynamic games with strategic complements. We explain the relative measure below.
Selten and Krischker (1983) introduced a measure for predictive success that accounts
for prediction accuracy and precision. As articulated by Selten (1991), a class of games
is accurate if it can predict real-world behavior successfully—this is what Table 2 reports.
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Table 3: Upper Big Blue District — Selten and Krischker’s (1983) measure of predictive success of the GW
program with (Panel A) strategic substitutes and (Panel B) strategic complements (sub-sample = 1,000).
Panel A – Strategic substitutes Number of farmers (N)
2 3 4 5 6 8
Years (T ) T = 2 −0.17 −0.15 −0.15 −0.18 −0.18 −0.14
T = 3 −0.3 −0.26 −0.17 −0.19 −0.12 −0.04
T = 4 −0.26 −0.15 −0.08 −0.05 −0.05 −0.02
T = 5 −0.13 −0.05 −0.03 −0.01 −0.01 0
T = 6 −0.06 −0.03 −0.01 0 0 0
T = 8 −0.01 0 0 0 0 0
Panel B – Strategic complements Number of farmers (N)
2 3 4 5 6 8
Years (T ) T = 2 0.12 0.25 0.29 0.36 0.38 0.49
T = 3 0.33 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.45 0.39
T = 4 0.46 0.42 0.37 0.34 0.28 0.24
T = 5 0.45 0.31 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.1
T = 6 0.34 0.22 0.15 0.1 0.06 0.02
T = 8 0.12 0.04 0.01 0 0 0
However, Selten (1991) argued that accuracy should be understood with respect to precision,
namely the relative size of the set of predicted outcomes. The higher the precision, the
smaller the set of predicted outcomes. If two classes of games are equally accurate, if the
first is more precise than the second, then the first should be preferred.
Selten and Krischker (1983) proposed a simple, straightforward way of comparing classes
of games that accounts for accuracy and prediction. If A is the accuracy and P is the precision,
then Selten and Krischker suggest that classes of games should be compared via its accuracy
minus the precision, or
m(A, P) = A − P (5)
(see Selten, 1991, who axiomized m(A, P) up to positive affine transformations and Beatty
and Crawford, 2011, for an alternative proof). If m(A, P) = 1−0 = 1, then observed behavior
is the unique prediction. If m(A, P) = 1 − 1 = 0, then the prediction’s accuracy is equally
offset by its lack of precision. For example, GW dynamic games from Corollary 1 have a
predictive success measure of m(A, P) = 1− 1 = 0 because it is perfectly accurate (A = 1) by
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virtue of being able to predict any behavior (P = 1).19
In our case, A represents the acceptance rate reported in Table 2. We estimate the precision
associated with GW dynamic games by assuming thatWi = [0, 40in] ∀i ∈ N (40in is the
most groundwater-usage observed in our datasets). We randomly sample (wti)(i,t)∈N×T and
farmers, and then run the GW program with strategic substitutes/complements; P is then the
acceptance rate using this randomly sampled data.
We report Selten and Krischker’s (1983) measure of predictive success in Table 3. As is
visually apparent, the evidence shows that GW dynamic games with strategic complements
is more successful at predicting behavior than its strategic substitutes analog. With the GW
program with strategic substitutes, we find that m(A, P) ≤ 0 for each (N,T ) case; this means
that the theory is systematically predicting the wrong region of ×i∈NWi. With the GW
program with strategic complements, we find that m(A, P) ≥ 0 for each (N,T ) case (we find
that m(A, P) ≥ 0.12 for T ≤ 3). Taken together, the evidence suggests that GW dynamic
games with strategic complements is a more accurate and precise theory for explaining UBB
behavior than GW dynamic games with strategic substitutes.
Upper Republican District— We report results using the URD dataset in Tables C.8 and C.9,
where a similar pattern emerges as above. As shown in Table C.8, we find that GW dynamic
games with strategic complements explains more data than its strategic substitutes analog.
However, from the perspective of Table C.8 alone, this difference is not as stark as the UBB
case. While strategic complements rationalizes 25 – 44% more UBB data than strategic
substitutes (restricting attention to T = 2, 3), we find that only 7–16% more URD data is
explained by strategic complements than strategic substitutes.
We report the measure of predictive success with URD data in Table C.9. This measure
sheds more light on the predictive success strategic complements. Similar to the UBB, for
the GW program with strategic substitutes, we find that m(A, P) ≤ 0 for each (N,T ) case;
this means that the theory systematically predicts the wrong region of ×i∈NWi. For the GW
program with strategic complements, we find that m(A, P) ≥ 0 for each (N,T ) case (we find
that m(A, P) ≥ 0.10 for T ≤ 3). From the perspective of predictive success, we again find
that GW dynamic games with strategic complements is a more accurate and precise theory
for explaining URD behavior than its strategic substitutes analog.
19Beatty and Crawford (2011) were the first to propose this measure as a way of shedding light on the
explanatory power of revealed preference tests.
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Robustness check: GW program with largeN














































(a) Upper Big Blue District (b) Upper Republican District
Figure 3: Acceptance rate of the GW program with strategic substitutes/complements with T = 2 as a function
of N.
4.5. Robustness check I: Larger N
A follow-up question is asking what acceptance rates look like for N > 8. Considering
up to eight neighbors indeed demonstrates that strategic complements is a better predictor
of behavior than strategic substitutes and that our revealed preference tests can reject even
small sample sizes. But does this pattern continue to hold for larger N? If not, then trying
to extrapolate our findings to UBB- and URD-wide behavior might be subject to concern.
We address this question by estimating acceptance rates for the GW program with strategic
substitutes/complements for T = 2 and N = {10, 20, . . . , 100, 200, 300} (we stopped at 300
because of computational limitations) for both the UBB andURD. The question here amounts
to asking whether the long-term trend of acceptance rates go up or down for the strategic
substitutes/complements models—if both acceptance rates go down, then our results might
not map to UBB- and URD-wide behavior more generally.
We report our findings in Figure 3. These results reinforce the findings in Tables 2–
C.9: especially for large N, strategic complements is a better predictor of behavior than
strategic substitutes. In both the UBB and URD, acceptance rates for the GW program with
strategic complements increases with increasing N. The opposite is true for the strategic
substitutes, where acceptance rates decreasewith increasing N. The difference in explanatory
power is most obvious in the UBB for N = 300: in this case, GW dynamic games with
strategic complements explains nearly 80%more data than GWdynamic games with strategic
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substitutes.
4.6. Robustness check II: Network structure
In Appendix C.1, we test the robustness of our results in two ways.
The first concerns network structure. Above, we study farmers’ revealed preference on a
single network structure based on local drawdown. We argued that this is a reasonable starting
point, as local drawdown is a well-known and widely discussed dynamic among farmers. But
it is unclear whether the local drawdown network is the true, or even appropriate network to
be studying strategic interactions, which begs the question: are our revealed preference test
results robust to different network structures?
The second concerns viewing our revealed preferences results at the population vs. in-
dividual level. We base conclusions on strategic substitutes vs. complements for the entire
URD and URD population on a handful of numbers. This begs the question: are all farmers’
pumping decisions explained by strategic complements, or are decisions better characterized
by a mix of substitutes and complements? In other words, we are interested in disaggregating
the results above from the population level to the individual level.
We address both robustness questions simultaneously in Appendix C.1. In brief, we can
define an acceptance rate per farmer by randomly sampling network structures and testing
each farmer’s passing rate of the various GW programs individually (see the appendix for
more details). We thus recover a distribution of acceptance rates, rather than a single value
for the entire UBB/URD.
We plot the results in Figure C.5, which support the results above in three ways. First,
we find that each farmer’s individual-level acceptance rate of the GW program with strategic
complements is higher than the strategic substitutes counterpart. This pattern is especially
true for the UBB, where strategic complements explains behavior 50% to 90% more often
than strategic substitutes. Second, the farmer-level acceptance rates cluster around those
reported above (the clustering is stronger for the UBB than the URD; see the figure). This
means that the group-level statistics we used do a reasonable job at representing farmer-level
behavior. Finally, the evidence suggests that strategic complements does a better job at
explaining behavior in the UBB than the URD. In the former, farmer-level acceptance rates
cluster around 0.7 and 0.1 for strategic complements and substitutes, respectively. In the
latter, farmer-level acceptance rates cluster around 0.7 and 0.35 for strategic complements
and substitutes, respectively.
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5. Estimating strategic interactions
In this section, we take another approach to test whether strategic behavior can be ex-
plained in terms of strategic substitutes or strategic complements. The test we used above
had the advantage of being nonparametric. However, the test was restricted to the classes
of dynamic games defined above, which means that we could only test for/against strate-
gic substitutes and complements that emerged from such game-theoretic assumptions. This
would exclude the possibility of testing for more behavioral drivers of groundwater-usage,
such as interactive preferences (Levine, 1998; Nax et al., 2015) and social norms (Ostrom,
1990). The goal of this section is to test behavior in way that explicitly avoids game-theoretic
assumptions by, instead, making parametric (i.e. regression) assumptions.
Using a non-game-theoretic and parametric approach, our goal is to address two ques-
tions. (i) Are strategic interactions important in common-pool resource settings? This is
a motivational question that we could not address with the revealed preference approach
above. But with appropriately designed regressions, we can pit strategic interactions against
other drivers of behavior, such as market and climate trends. (ii) If strategic interactions
are important, does strategic complements characterize groundwater-usage? That is, we are
looking for secondary evidence that supports the findings in the previous section.
In the end, we find a resounding ‘yes’ to both questions: our evidence suggests that
strategic complements play an equally important role, if not more, than any other exogenous
driver of behavior.
This section is structured as follows. We begin by presenting our regression framework
and clarifying what substitutes and complements mean in this context. Following, we discuss
our estimation strategy. We then present the hypothesis test setup and results. We conclude
by relating our findings here with the revealed preference test results in the previous section.
5.1. Data
In our analysis below, we proceed only with the UBB data and not with the URD data
because the URD quota policy poses an empirical issue. If a farmer in the URD exceeds
his/her quota, then his/her future quota will be decreaed. On the other hand, the quota policy
allows farmers to ‘save’ unused groundwater quota for future years. As such, each URD
farmer’s groundwater pumping from 1982–2000 can influence can influence his/her behavior
that we observe from 2001–14. But because URD data does not include decisions before




Strategic network — The first step in estimating strategic interactions is clarifying with
whom a farmer strategically interacts. To do so, the longitude-latitude information in the
dataset comes into play. As in Section 3, letNi ⊆ N\{i} be farmer i’s neighbors. We combine
neighborhoods to define a strategic network A ∈ RN×N+ as a N-by-N matrix where each row
Ai = (Ai j) j∈N represents farmer i’s neighborhood such that Ai j > 0 if and only if j ∈ Ni,
andAi j = 0 otherwise. The matrix is row-normalized.
Regression model — Suppose that the strategic network,A, is known a priori (we relax this
assumption later on). We assume that farmer i’s behavior in season t ∈ T is explained by20
wti = αi + βN
∑
j∈N
Ai jwtj + x
t
iψ + y
tφ + diγ + ũti. (6)
The second term, βN
∑
j∈N Ai jwtj, corresponds to i’s behavior as determined by strategic
interactions. xti denotes a 1 × K vector of individual-level time-varying exogenous controls
included in the dataset—including groundwater levels and interaction terms, such as raint ×
land-sizei—and ψ is the corresponding K × 1 parameter vector. yt denotes a 1 × L vector of
UBB-wide time-varying exogenous controls included in the dataset—including crop prices,
electricity prices, rain, temperature, and land rental rates—and φ is the corresponding L × 1
parameter vector. di is a 1×R vector of farmer-level time-invariant controls—including land-
size, well depth, transmmissivity, and soil type—and γ is its corresponding R × 1 parameter
vector. αi is a farmer specific fixed-effect constant. Because we are interested in βN , we can
use a first-difference estimator, which means that we estimate













yt − yt−1)φ + uti, (7)
thereby avoid estimating (αi)i∈N and γ.
The final term, ũti, captures overall disturbance and makes it possible to control for
unobserved and possibly confounding factors. Perhaps most importantly, we must control for
disturbances that can occur spatially; e.g., hail storms can damage a localized region of the
UBB, which is unobserved in the dataset but may appear to take the form of positive/negative
strategic interactions between farmers. We can model such unobserved events by exploiting




i < 0 is not possible. We
remove log to keep notation lighter.
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the fact that it changes behavior in a spatially tractable way.
We proceed with a commonly made assumption that such disturbances are related via a




Bi jutj + ν
t
i. (8)
where ρ is the degree of spatial correlation,B ∈ RN×N+ is a weighting matrix that governs the
spatial relation between i and j (B may be different thanA), and νti captures the individual-
time innovations. The expression in (8) is also known as aCliff andOrd (1973a,b) process (see
also Kapoor et al., 2007, Baltagi, 2008, and Mutl and Pfaffermayr, 2011). The interpretation
of (8) is that, if j receives an unobserved shock utj, then his/her neighbors defined by B
experience a shock ρutj.
Our goal is to estimate (7,8).
Hypotheses — Based on the regression setup above, our null and alternative hypotheses are
given as follows.
Null hypothesis, H ′0 : Framers’ groundwater-usage decisions are strategic sub-
stitutes or do not exhibit any systematic relations.
Alternative hypothesis, H ′A : Framers’ groundwater-usage decisions are strate-
gic complements.
The null hypothesis here is slightly different than that considered in the previous section.
Here, we give the benefit of the doubt to strategic substitutes by allowing for the possibility
that, in our regression framework, strategic substitutes are not identifiable.
How doH ′0 andH
′
A translate to the regression setup above? Supposing we estimate (7,8)
robustly, we can utilize βN ± 2SE to delineate between our null and alternative hypotheses.
For an estimated βN ± 2SE, H ′0 holds if and only if βN − 2SE ≤ 0 (otherwise, βN − 2SE >
0 ⇐⇒ H ′A ). Before discussing the p-value associated with testing H ′0 vs. H ′A , we must
first discuss how we estimate (7,8).
5.3. Identification
As we briefly noted in the introduction, such a regression model cannot be estimated
without somehow addressing issues related to endogeneity. In particular, if watertj is used
to explain waterti, which is used to explain watertj, then there exists endogeneity that may
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bias the estimation of coefficients in uninterpretable ways—as j influences him/herself by
virtue of influencing i. This identification issue is known as the reflection problem (Manski,
1993; Moffit, 2001), and resolving it requires a suitably selected set of instrumental variables
(IVs).21
We address this issue by utilizing an IV setup proposed by Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2011)
for fixed-effect regression designs (which builds on Kapoor et al., 2007 and Baltagi, 2008).
Specifcially, Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2011) assume that, from any farmer i’s perspective,
his/her neighbors’ control variables do not influence wti directly, but only indirectly by virtue
of influencing
∑
j∈N Ai jwtj directly. This means that A and i’s neighbors’ control variables
can be used as the basis of IVs. Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2011) go on to show that B can be
used to render such IVs uncorrelated with the error terms, which means that βN is identified
in our setting.
Following Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2011),A,B and the control variables in the dataset can
be organized to form IVs for estimating (7,8). We refer the interested reader to Appendix B
for a derivation of the IVs as well as a discussion on the assumptions required to estimate
(7,8) robustly.
5.4. Testing procedure
The estimator procedure proposed byMutl and Pfaffermayr (2011) requires an assumption
that is somewhat problematic in our setting, namely that matrices A and B are observed.
Our setting has a different setup. The UBB dataset has information about the geographical
location of farmers, and it is possible to leverage this information to define a network that
represents interactions based on local drawdown. Yet, while we have reason to believe
that defining ‘local’ interaction networks based on this information is a reasonable starting
point, such a network may not necessarily represent the true strategic interaction networks
describing reality.
It turns out that resolving this issue also allows us to derive a p-value for testing our
hypotheses. We proceed as follows. We define a set of networks N large enough to
encompass at least oneA∗,B∗ ∈ N that represent the true network of strategic interactions
and spatially correlated disturbances, respectively. We then randomly sample from this set
of networks and estimate (6,8), which means that we recover βN ± 2SE from each randomly
21See Blume et al. (2010) for an overview of the reflection problems and various approaches to resolving
it. In spatial/network games à la Jackson (2008), using IVs is one of the most systematically explored means
of resolving endogeneity; see, e.g., Bramoulle et al. (2009). We utilize a technique proposed by Mutl and
Pfaffermayr (2011) because it allows us to incorporate spatially correlated errors.
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sampled network. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, it is shown below that the ‘sampling’
of βNs in this way follows a normal distribution (statistically speaking). This allows us to
calculate the probability of identifying a network such that βN − 2SE ≤ 0, which is given as
P
[
A,B ∈ N : βN − 2SE ≤ 0] . (9)
Recall that, for an estimated βN ±2SE, H ′0 holds if and only if βN −2SE ≤ 0. This means
that (9)—which is the probability of sampling such that H ′0 is true—serves as a p-value for
testing H ′0 versus H
′
A .
This testing procedure is valid only if the true networks A∗ and B∗ are inside of N .
More formally, we say that N ⊆ RN×N+ is the set of feasible networks if it contains every
A ∈ RN×N+ such that: (i) Aii = 0, or no farmer strategically affects him/herself, (ii) Ai j > 0
only if i and j are less than 5 miles apart, depending on the case, (that is, only neighbors
induce strategic interaction effects), (iii)Ai j = Aik for any j and k with non-zero weights, or
neighbors strategically affect i equally, and (iv)A is row normalized. Our testing procedure
requires the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Let N represent the set of feasible networks. Then there exists at least one
pair of networks A∗,B∗ ∈ N that represents the true network of strategic interactions and
spatially correlated disturbances in the UBB, respectively.
We assume that neighbors come from less than 5 miles for two reasons. First, we in-
corporate the ‘local drawdown network’, which characterizes interactions that occur between
farmers less than 1 mile. Second, we wish to extend the network space in order to incorporate
other possible avenues for strategic interactions. It could be that the true network of interac-
tions takes place on a larger scale than one mile if, e.g., mechanisms such as social pressure
are at play—this is especially true taking into account that some farmers live in towns that
are several miles away from their farm land. Therefore, we increase the scope of possible
networked strategic interactions to increase the scope of possible mechanisms that could be
tested.
In Appendix C, we run the same statistical test supposing that networked strategic inter-
actions take place between farmers less than {1, 3, 10, 20} miles away as a robustness check.
We find that the results are nearly the same as those presented below.
5.5. Results
We randomly sample 10,000 pairs of A,B ∈ N and estimate (7,8) for each pair ac-
cordingly. This allows us to estimate (9), namely the probability of sampling a network that
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Table 4: Micro-level regressions on UBB data. Number of observations = 97,160. Number of randomly
sampled regressions = 10,000. Regressions are combined using the Rubin’s rule (Rubin, 1987), and p-values
are calculatd using the Barnard-Rubin corrected degrees of freedom (Barnard and Rubin, 1999).
Dependent variable: Log (Waterti)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strategic interaction effects
Log(Neighbors’ waterti) 0.956∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.307 0.237∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.027) (0.352) (0.032) (0.022) (0.027)
Groundwater controls
Spring GWti −0.03∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Spring GWti − Fall GWt−1i 0.019∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
UBB-level time-dependent controls
Spot market pricet 0.018∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Electricityt −0.115∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.01) (0.009)
Land rental ratestCi 0.107
∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Raint −0.164∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗ −0.163∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Temperaturet −0.105∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
(Temp.)×(Rain)t −0.055∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Farmer- and time-dependent controls
(Land-size)×(Rain)ti −0.017∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(Land-size)×(Rain)ti −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(Well depth)×(Rain)ti −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(Well depth)×(Temp.)ti 0.005∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(Land-size)×(Rain)×(Temp.)ti −0.016∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(Well depth)×(Rain)×(Temp.)ti −0.014∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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supports our null hypothesis that farmers’ decisions are strategic substitutes. This is our main
finding and is presented in Section 5.5.2.
But before we can discuss these results, it is crucial to understand whether we have ‘good’
IVs. Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2011) prove that the IVs—which we derive in Appendix B—are
orthogonal to the disturbances terms. While this is important, the IVsmust still be sufficiently
correlated with wtNi for the purposes of identification. A number of issues can arise if we
do not have ‘good’ IVs: if we have weak IVs or if the results are sensitive to which IVs are
used, then any findings we report are potentially moot. We thus show evidence that our IVs
are valid before discussing the main findings.
5.5.1. Robustness of IVs
One way to check IVs is testing whether results are robust to different IVs. With a number
of different IVs, if each report a different strategic interaction term βN , then we are left with
a problem because it suggests that our IVs are either (i) weak or (ii) unable to identify wtNi
robustly. Yet, if different IVs each yield roughly the same βN , then we have good reason to
believe that our IVs are indeed identifying strategic interactions.
We take this approach as a robustness check of our IV estimation procedure. We esti-
mate (7,8) using six different IV setups, and we report the findings in Table 4. The first two
focus on using groundwater levels and UBB-wide variables, such as rainfall and crop prices.
The second two models focus on using individual-level and UBB-wide variables, such as
(land-sizei)×(rainfallt). The fifth model utilizes a mix of IVs from the previous four. The final
model utilizes all control variables included in our UBB dataset. To estimate parameters,
we randomly sample 10,000 networks A,B ∈ N and combine the regression estimations
using Rubin’s rule (Rubin, 1987). This means that: (i) the coefficients are combined using
a simple average, (ii) standard errors are combined in a way that accounts for between-
and within-variance of the estimated coefficients, and (iii) p-values are computed using the
Barnard-Rubin corrected degrees of freedom (Barnard and Rubin, 1999). All coefficients
are normalized, so that, for all the control variables, β =% increase in groundwater usage per
+1SD increase in the variable.
Two patterns in Table 4 give positive evidence that our UBB control variables are able
to identify strategic interaction effects. First, in models (2,4,6) where we include market
and climate trends, we recover roughly the same βN . Interestingly, model (3) shows that
interacting farmer-level controls with climate variable also results in the same βN as models
(2,4,6) but with very high SEs. The interpretation is that the IVs in model (3) were consistent
but very weak. Second, it is obvious when IVs are weak/fail in Table 4. Models (1) and
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Test of negative (H ′0) vs. positive (H
′
A) strategic interaction effects














Hypothesis test results for H 00 vs. H
0
A
N(µ, 2) KS p-value p-value for H 00 vs. H 0A
Neighs  5 miles (0.351, 0.015) 0.69 <0.0001
Figure 4: (Top Table) Results for KS-test of the distribution of (second column) βN − 2SE and (third column)
H ′0 vs. H
′
A . (Bottom Figure) βN for randomly sampled network structures. Interpretation of βN : +1w
t
Ni
corresponds to +(100% × βN ) increase in wti.
(5) show that when market and climate variables are excluded, we recover estimates where
βN ≈ 1. This is problematic because spatial regression models are generally not identifiable
if βN ≥ 1, and recovering βN ≈ 1 suggests that identification issues are present.
The main takeaway is that our estimation procedure is robust to which IVs we use, as
long as we use ‘good’ IVs. As such, we proceed with model (6) because it yielded the lowest
SE for βN . Our main findings do not change if we instead use model (2) or (4).
5.5.2. Main findings
Ourmain findings, presented in Figure 4, are based on the 10,000 regressions that underlie
model (6) in Table 4. Figure 4 has two parts. First, in the lower figure, we plot every (βN−2SE)
estimated for each randomly sampled A,B ∈ N ; in practice, there are 10,000 estimates.
The visual evidence is unambiguous: we find that every estimated βN − 2SE > 0.2 > 0. This
already points to strong and robust evidence againstH ′0 and in favor of strategic complements.
Our second set of findings in the upper Table formalize that which is visually apparent in
the histogram below. We find that the distribution of recovered βN − 2SE follow a normal
distribution—we report the fitted normal distribution in the fist column, N(µ, σ2), and the
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-value in the second column (p = 0.70). With evidence of
βN − 2SE following a normal distribution, we can thus estimate the probability of drawing
any A,B ∈ N such that βN − 2SE ≤ 0, which serves as the p-value for testing H ′0 vs.
H ′A (see equation (9)). We report this value in the third column. As is visually evident in
the histogram, the probability of finding networks such that βN − 2SE ≤ 0 is statistically
negligible. This means that we reject the null hypothesis with unambiguously low p-values.
Our results instead point to strong and robust evidence in favor our alternative hypothesis,
that is, positive strategic interactions characterize groundwater-usage decisions.
We next address our first question posed at the beginning of this section: are strategic
interactions the appropriate framework to be studying groundwater-usage behavior? We
are interested in comparing these effects for two reasons. The first reason is motivational:
perhaps the UBB is best-modeled as a single-agent decision-making process, where behavior
is driven by the market and not strategic interactions? The second reason is more related
to policymaking. A key mission of the UBB and URD is to equip farmers with the tools
to pump groundwater at a profitable yet sustainable rate. As such, understanding whether
groundwater usage is more influenced by the market versus strategic interactions helps NRDs
more generally to make the most effective decisions.
It is clear from model (6) in Table C.7 that strategic interactions are the main driver of
behavior. We find that crop price movements have a minor a effect on groundwater-usage.
Rainfall is the second strongest predictor of behavior, where we find that a 1 SD increase in
rainfall (= 5.8 inches) is associated with a 16% decrease in groundwater usage. Farmland
rental rates is also strongly associated with groundwater-usage (which complements Kirwan,
2009). That said, strategic interactions is the strongest driver of behavior. We find that βN
is greater than 2× the absolute value of any other effect, and, on average, a 50% decrease in
neighbors’ pumping is associated with a 13.7% decrease in a farmer’s pumping. In sum, we
find evidence that strategic complements not only characterizes behavior better than strategic
substitutes, but it also characterizes behavior better than models that explicitly avoid strategic
interactions.
Robustness check — The testing procedure above assumed that are less than five miles
away. In Appendix C.2, we relax this assumption by running the same testing procedure and
allowing that neighbors can be {1, 3, 5, 10, 20} miles away. We report p-values for each case
in Table C.6 and combine the 10,000 regressions for each case via Rubin’s rule in Table C.7.
We find that, qualitatively, our results remain unchanged: βN − 2SE > 0 for almost every
A,A ∈ N we randomly sample. The similar to above, we unambiguously reject our null
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hypothesis with strong evidence that positive strategic interactions characterize groundwater
pumping.
5.6. Predicting revealed preferences
We end by exploring connections between this section and the revealed preference results
from Section 4. The main question we consider is: are the positive strategic interactions
in Figure 4 associated with the same mechanism(s) that underlie the low (high) acceptance
rates of the GW program with strategic substitutes (complements)? This association is not
obvious. The revealed preference setup was rooted in game-theoretic reasoning, and the type
of mechanisms that underlie our results are likely related to non-cooperative collusion (Green
and Porter, 1984; Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986) and social norms (Young, 1993; Young and
Burke, 2001; Burke and Young, 2010). By estimating interactions, however, we appeal to a
much broader class of mechanisms that may not be captured by GW dynamic games with
strategic complements. Whether the two tests have rejected strategic substitutes for the same
reason remains to be shown.
We can test this relationship empirically using the following setup. Consider a randomly
sampled networkA ∈ N .
- We can useA = B to estimate interactions βN .
- We can also use A in a revealed preference setup. Similar to Section 4, we randomly
sample farmers and also draw their neighbors according toA. We test each farmer and
his/her neighbors via the GW program with strategic substitutes/complements fixing
T = 2. This means that we recover {1, 0} each farmer where 0 = failing the GW
program and 1 = passing the GW program.
In practice, we randomly sample 2,000 networks and 100 farmers form each network, which
amounts to 200,000 observations. These observations are indexed according to network (A),
farmer (i), and consecutive time periods (τ).
We test whether βN can predict the probability of drawing farmers that can pass the GW
program with strategic substitutes/complements. Let S (A) (C(A)) denote the probability of
passing the GW program with strategic substitutes (complements) for network m. We can










= γ3 βN(A) + γ4 |Ni|(A,i) + ε(A,i,τ)
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Table 5: Predicting revealed preferences with estimated strategic interactions. Coefficients are reported in terms
of log odd ratio.
Dependent variable: Acceptance rate of the GW program
Substitutes Complements
(S.1) (S.2) (C.1) (C.2)
βN −2.088∗∗ −2.004∗∗ 0.552∗ 0.520∗
(0.872) (0.874) (0.303) (0.304)
# of neighbors −0.021∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0002)
(constant) −2.777∗∗∗ −0.860∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗
(0.385) (0.389) (0.134) (0.136)
Observations 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000
Log Likelihood −22,764 −22,033 −115,685 −115,416
AIC 45,532 44,071 231,373 230,838
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
where |Ni|(A,i) controls for how pass/fail rates are influenced by havingmore or less neighbors,
and ε(A,i,τ) accounts for unobserved errors.
We report results in Table 5 (coefficients are reported in terms of log odds ratio). Columns
(S.1) and (S.2) use the pass/fail results of the GW program with strategic substitutes as the
dependent variable. Columns (C.1) and (C.2) use the pass/fail results of the GW program
with strategic complements as the dependent variable.
The key variable in Table 5 is βN , which relates estimated strategic interactions with
pass/fail rates of the GW program. The evidence is as anticipated: higher βN corresponds
with (i) lower acceptance rates of the GW program with strategic substitutes and (ii) higher
acceptance rates of the GW program with strategic complements. That is, the sign of βN is
correct. But taking a closer look at the magnitude of this effect sheds light on a somewhat
different perspective. For a farmer with eight neighbors, we estimate that increasing strategic
interactions from zero to βN = 0.5 (nearly the highest we estimated): (i) decreases the
acceptance rate of the GW program with strategic substitutes by 17% and (ii) increases the
acceptance rate of the GW program with strategic complements by 6%. In other words,
spanning the entire space of observed βN amounts to a marginal change in GW program
acceptance rates.
It is true that these are not groundbreaking coefficients, which is itself an insightful finding.
The interpretation is that the mechanism(s) driving the high (low) acceptance rate of the GW
43
program with strategic substitutes (complements) is only loosely related to the mechanism(s)
driving the positive strategic interactions. We take this as evidence that a multiplicity of
mechanisms are at play: somewhat overlapping mechanisms drive the revealed preference
test results and the regression results. But, based on our findings, these mechanisms have the
unifying feature that strategic complements, not substitutes, characterize groundwater-usage.
6. Outlook
This paper takes a step by putting to the test two disparate perspectives that persist in the
CPR literature. Broadly speaking, the two can be contrasted as theory versus evidence, as
was done in a recent Science policy forum (December 2018) entitled “Tragedies Revisited”
where scholars from both sides were invited to contribute. To illustrate the divide, we cite
from two contributions in this special issue:
Representing the anti-theory side, Boyd and Richerson (2018) voice sharp criticism:
“The enduring influence of Hardin’s essay testifies to the power of a clear argu-
ment [...] This argument is clear and powerful, but wrong. Many village-scale
human societies have organized hundreds of people to [...] solve commons prob-
lems, regulated not by formal coercive institutions but by informal, culturally
evolved moral norms.”
In defense of theory, Jackson (2018) says:
“Over the past five decades, we have come to a deep understanding of commons
problems and how to solve them [...] Game theory and market design have
helped us understand how to provide appropriate incentives.”
These two views stand at odds. The former claims that game theory is wrong, and the
solutions to commons problems lie in informal and evolved social norms, while the latter
heralds the contributions game theory has made to resolving commons problems.
In our view, both statements are wrong. Game theory is neither wrong—as is evidenced
by the many CPRs that are being depleted—nor right—as is evidenced by the many CPRs
that are successfully governed without formal mechanisms (Ostrom, 1990). In this paper,
we take the middle ground and ask how game theory must be corrected in order to reconcile
the behavioral patterns that have become clear after 40+ years of fieldwork and empirical
research.
Based on a unique dataset of detailed groundwater usage in the American Midwest, we
firstly pursued a revealed preference test which forcefully rejected the benchmark game theory
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model. We could have stopped here and taken this result as motivation to revisit, not the
behavioral micro-foundations of the theory in terms of rationality and behavior per se, but
the underlying game of the CPR model itself. It is possible that the canonical CPR model
we presented here, despite being substantially more general than previous models, is still too
simple and therefore under-specified to capture the salient drivers of behavior. We see three
dimensions along which we could enrich model. First, we could obtain alternative models
that could be consistent with our data by enriching the strategy space of farmers. For example,
we could incorporate inter-seasonal dynamics of crop choice, the intra-seasonal dynamics of
irrigation, the use of fertilizers, crop-share agreements, the use of options, etc., that result
in strategic complements between farmers. Second, we could model the incomplete and
asymmetric nature of information explicitly (Fershtman and Pakes, 2012), which again could
change predictions in such a way that our data could be rationalized. Finally, we could
elaborate the stochastic nature of the game, which would open up more complex strategies
such as non-cooperative collusion that could offer a means of rationalizing our data (Green
and Porter, 1984; Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986).
We could call this line of enriching the game as the “game specification correction
project”—that is, taking evidence against a simple model as motivation to enrich the model—
without immediately challenging the underlying behavioral assumptions.22 This is obviously
a valid approach, as we have not falsified the behavioral assumptions per se, but only rejected
the combined hypotheses of the proposed model and the behavioral assumptions. For the
moment, however, this would be a dead end in our opinion, as suitable tests for those richer
models have not yet been proposed.
The dead end of this approach brings us to our exploratory analyses concerning the
underlying behavioral assumptions. This analysis points to strong and robust evidence in favor
of positive interaction effects, which can be viewed as evidence of a flawed behavioral model.
Taking such a perspective, then should we pursue a “behavioral assumptions correction
project” instead?23 Such a project would use these findings to build alternative behavioral
foundations for formulating new CPR models, where the structural components of the pre-
existent game theory are preserved (rather than enriched as outlined above) but the behavioral
assumptions are exchanged. Such models would incorporate behavioral assumptions that
22Here, we loosely adapt the expression “subjective expected utility correction project” coined by Gigerenzer
and Selten (2001), which is used to describe the social preferences approach.
23This would include both the “subjective expected utility correction project” and other approaches allowing
for bounded rationality.
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would mirror other streams of behavioral economics.
Exploring this second route of revisiting, not the CPR game itself, but the behavioral
foundations of CPR usage, the immediate challenge would be to formulate a model that
would produce positive interaction effects. Indeed, there exists a well-developed experimental
literature that has uncovered various behavioral patterns that might do this. One candidate
for driving positive interaction effects is conditional cooperation (Fischbacher et al., 2001).
Controlled laboratory and online experiments have found extensive evidence of conditional
cooperation, however, the existing evidence in field work on CPRs is conflicting (Rustagi
et al., 2010; Stoop et al., 2012) and suggest that such a simple account may not be sufficient.
Another candidate is the presence of social preferences à la Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002), and Fehr and Schmidt
(2006). Alternatively, social preferencemodelswhere pro-/anti-social attitudes are interactive
(Levine, 1998; Nax et al., 2015) and/or interdependent (Sobel, 2005) could be developed in
the CPR context, which would likely produce positive interaction effects in resource usage
too (via the positive interactions between preferences). The third and final candidate we
would like to list is the presence of locally evolving social norms (Young, 2015), whose
enforcements may require a number of elements currently not encoded in our dataset related
to punishment of groundwater abusers (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000, 2002), social pressuring
(Gaechter and Fehr, 1999; Masclet, 2003), and collective identities (Eckel and Grossman,
2005; Charness et al., 2007).
In sum, we hope the contributions in this paper will: (i) on the one hand, help the
empirical literature side incorporate the “game specification correction project” into future
analyses rather than considering game theory moot based on clearly over-simplified models,
and, (ii) on the other hand, help the game theory literature incorporate the “behavioral
correction project” to build behavioral models that reflect real-world empirical patterns.
These thoughts bring us back to Elinor Ostrom, the daily activities of the NRDs, and
the policy implications of our findings more generally. Game theory has had a definitive
impact on the governance of CPRs. Policy recommendations frequently rely on game theory
as a means of arguing for/against resource regulatory measures, which is evident in, e.g.,
Huang and Smith (2014) who propose an alternative to the Individual Transferable Quota
policy that is widely applied in CPR management today (Stavins, 2011). However, re-
considering game-theoretic foundations also calls for a re-consideration of downstream policy
recommendations: “When the results of a theory seem to flow specifically from a special
crucial assumption, then if the assumption is dubious, the results are suspect,” (Solow, 1956).
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As such, fresh look that this paper brings to the strategic foundations of CPRs suggests, as




A.1. Brief summary of nonsmooth optimization
Before we prove Theorems 1 and 2, we review some concepts related to nonsmooth
optimization, in particular a necessary (and sufficient condition) for a local (global) maximum
of a nonsmooth function (these notes are taken from Clarke, 1983).
Let f : RK → R be an absolutely continuous function. The generalized directional
derivative of f at x ∈ RK in the direction of d ∈ RK is given as
f ◦(x; d) = lim sup
y→x,t↓0
f (y + td) − f (y)
t
.
The generalized directional derivative always exists for an absolutely continuous function.
Following Clarke (1983), we define the subdifferential of f at x as
∂ f (x) = {ξ ∈ RK : f ◦(x; d) ≥ ξT d ∀d ∈ RK}.
Each vector ξ ∈ ∂ f (x) is called a subgradient of f at x.
The following theorem is an analog of the first-order condition from standard smooth
optimization theory. Broadly speaking, it says that x is a local maximizer of f only if 0 is
a subgradient of f at x. If f is concave, then 0 ∈ ∂ f (x) is both a necessary and sufficient
condition for x to be a global solution to maxx′∈RK f (x′).
Theorem 3 (Clarke, 1983, Proposition 2.3.2, p. 38). Let f : RK → R be an absolutely
continuous function.
(i) If f attains a local maximum at x then 0 ∈ ∂ f (x).
(ii) If f is concave, then f attains a global maximum at x if and only if 0 ∈ ∂ f (x).
A.2. Proof of Theorem 1
Let ∂Rti(wti) denote the subdifferential of Rti at wti. The subdifferentials ∂F ti (·,wt−i) and
∂Pti(·,wt−i) with respect to wti are defined accordingly. These subdifferentials are non-empty
sets since all functions are assumed to be absolutely continuous.
A.2.1. (B) =⇒ (A)
We prove the necessity of (CGD), (MGD), and (MLD) separately.
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Necessity of (CGD) — Consider farmer i in season t. Because Pti is absolutely continu-
ous and wti ∈ Wi = R+ is an interior solution, it follows from Theorem 3 that wti solves
maxxi∈Wi Pti(xi,wt−i) only if 0 ∈ ∂Pti(wti,wt−i). That is, wti ∈ arg maxxi∈Wi Pti(xi,wt−i) only if
there exists ρ̃ti ∈ ∂Rti(wti) and f̃ ti ∈ ∂F ti (wti,wt−i) such that
ρ̃ti − ei ·
(
gt,Springi + G(W t − rt) +Li(wtNi + wti)
)
+ f̃ ti = 0. (A.1)






/ei. Then re-arranging terms in (A.1) yields
G(W t − rt) = f̂ ti − λ̂ti − gt,Springi . (A.2)
Note that G(W t − rt) is common for all farmers. Consequently,
∀i, j, t : f̂ ti − λ̂ti − gt,Springi = f̂ tj − λ̂tj − gt,Springj .
Necessity of (MGD) — By assumption, G is absolutely continuous and nondecreasing in
{W t − rt}t∈T . Then for any z′, z′′ ∈ {W t − rt}t∈T , it follows that z′ > (=) z′′ =⇒ G(z′) > (=
) G(z′′). Translating this to farmer i ∈ N in seasons s, t ∈ T amounts to
W s − rs > (=) W t − rt
=⇒ G(W s − rs) > (=) G(W t − rt)
⇐⇒ f̂ si − λ̂si − gs,Springi > (=) f̂ ti − λ̂ti − gt,Springi
where ⇐⇒ holds from (A.2). Since W s − rs > (=) W t − rt =⇒ f̂ si − λ̂si − gs,Springi > (=
) f̂ ti − λ̂ti − gt,Springi , it follows that (MGD) is necessary.
Necessity of (MLD) — By assumption, Li is absolutely continuous and nondecreasing in
{wtNi + wti}t∈T . This means that, for any s, t ∈ T ,
wsNi + w
s





=⇒ Li(wsNi + wsi ) > (=) Li(wtNi + wti)
⇐⇒ λ̂si − λ̂ti > (=) 0
where ⇐⇒ holds by the definition of λ̂si and λ̂si . Since wsNi + wsi > (=) wtNi + wti =⇒
hatλsi − λ̂ti, > (=) 0, it follows that (MLD) is necessary. Q.E.D.
49
A.2.2. (A) =⇒ (B)
Here, we prove that the GW program is sufficient for the existence of a GW dynamic
game that can rationalize O .
Suppose that { f̂ ti , λ̂ti}(i,t)∈N×T are positive numbers that solve the GW program. We con-
struct each function underlying the GW dynamic game separately.
Revenue functions — We define all revenue functions as constant (which means they are all
concave). That is, ∀i ∈ N and t ∈ T , we let Rti(wi) = R ∀wi ∈ Wi.
Local drawdown functions — We begin by defining local drawdown functions. For any
farmer i, let {wtNi +wti}t∈T be in increasing order. Then it follows from (MLD) that wtNi +wti >
(=) wt+1Ni + w
t+1
i =⇒ λ̂ti > (=) λ̂t+1i . We define Li : R+ → R+ as a piecewise linear function
such that Li(wtNi + wti) = λ̂ti ∀t ∈ T . As such, (MLD) ensures that Li is an absolutely
continuous and nondecreasing function of wNi + wi.
Global depletion function — Fix i ∈ N (which i is used is inconsequential because of
(CDG)). Let {W t − rt}t∈T be in increasing order. It then follows from (MGD) that W t − rt >
(=) W t+1 − rt+1 =⇒ f̂ ti − λ̂ti − gt,Springi > (=) f̂ t+1i − λ̂t+1i − gt+1,Springi . We define G : R→ R as
a piecewise linear function such that G(W t − rt) = f̂ ti − λ̂ti − gt,Springi ∀t ∈ T . As such, (MGD)
ensures that G : R → R defined as such is an absolutely continuous and nondecreasing
function of W − r.
Energy cost — We let ei = 1 ∀i ∈ N .
Future profit functions — Fix i ∈ N and t ∈ T . Let hti : W → R+ be a function of
(wi,w−i) with the following properties: (i) hti is continuously differentiable in all arguments,
(ii) hti(·,w−i) is strictly decreasing in wi for every w−i ∈ W−i, and (iii) hti(wti,wt−i) = f̂ ti . We
define a future profit function F ti :W→ R as follows:




It follows by construction that: (i) Fi is concave in wi because hti(·,w−i) is strictly decreasing
in wi for each w−i and (ii) f̂ ti ∈ ∂F ti (wti,wt−i). Each (F ti )(i,t)∈N×T is defined accordingly.
Optimizing net-present value — All that remains is to show that wti optimizes i’s net-present
value in season t. By construction, Pti is concave in wti since: Rti is concave, −Cti is concave
in wti as G and Li are nondecreasing in their respective arguments, and F ti is concave in wti
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for each wt−i. Consequently, it follows from Theorem 3(ii) that wti solves maxxi∈Wi Pti(xi,wt−i)
if and only if 0 ∈ ∂Pti(wti,wt−i). This holds if
0 − gt,Springi − G(W t − rt) − Li(wtNi + wti) + f̂ ti = 0
⇐⇒ f̂ ti − λ̂ti − gt,Springi = G(W t − rt),
(A.3)
where the latter equation in (A.3) is ensured by (CGD). Hence, wti solves maxxi∈Wi Pti(xi,wt−i)
by Theorem 3. Q.E.D.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 2
A.3.1. (D) =⇒ (C)
Here, we prove the necessity of the GW program with strategic substitutes/complements.
Necessity of (CGD), (MGD), and (MLD) follow directly from the proof of Theorem 1.
Hence, all that remains is to show the necessity of (SUBS)/(COMP).
Let {ρ̃ti}(i,t)∈N×T and { f̃ ti }(i,t)∈N×T be from the proof of Theorem 1 (specifically Sec-
tion A.2.1). Define ρi(·) such that (i) ρi(wi) ∈ ∂Ri(wi) ∀wi ∈ Wi and (ii) ρi(wti) = ρ̃ti for
every t ∈ T . Similarly, define fi(·) such that (i) fi(wi,wNi) ∈ ∂Fi(wi,wNi) ∀(wi,wNi) ∈ R2+ and
(ii) fi(wti,wtNi) = f̃
t
i ∀t ∈ T .









Pti = ρi(wti) − ei ·
(
gt,Springi + G(W t − rt) +
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were (A.5) follows because Ri and Fi are concave in wi and wsi > wti, (A.6) follows because
Pti is submodular (supermodular) in (wi,wNi) and G is slowly changing in wNi , and (A.7)


















/ei, it follows that (A.4) ≥ (A.7) if and only if
f̂ ti − gt,Springi − G(W t − rt) − λ̂ti ≥ f̂ si − gt,Springi − G(W t − rt) − λ̂si
⇐⇒ 0 ≥
(




f̂ ti − λ̂ti
)
,
which means that (SUBS)/(COMP) is necessary. Q.E.D.
A.3.2. (C) =⇒ (D)
Here, we prove the sufficiency of the GW program with strategic substitutes (comple-
ments). Let { f̂ ti , λ̂ti}(i,t)∈N×T be positive numbers that solve the GW program with strategic
substitutes (complements).
Revenue functions — We define all revenue functions as constant (which means they are all
concave). That is, ∀i ∈ N , we let Ri(wi) = R ∀wi ∈ Wi.
Local drawdown functions — We let Li(x) = 0 ∀x ∈ R+.
Global depletion functions — Fix i ∈ N (which i is used is inconsequential because of
(CDG)). Let {W t − rt}t∈T be in increasing order. It then follows from (MGD) that W t − rt >
(=) W t+1 − rt+1 =⇒ f̂ ti − λ̂ti − gt,Springi > (=) f̂ t+1i − λ̂t+1i − gt+1,Springi . We define G : R→ R as
a piecewise linear function such that G(W t − rt) = f̂ ti − λ̂ti − gt,Springi ∀t ∈ T . As such, (MGD)
ensures that G : R → R defined as such is an absolutely continuous and nondecreasing
function of W − r.
Energy costs — We let ei = 1 for every (i, t) ∈ N × T .
Future profit functions — Fix i ∈ N . Let hi : R2+ → R+ be a function of (wi,wNi) with the
following properties: (i) hi is absolutely continuous in all arguments, (ii) hi(·,wNi) is strictly
decreasing in wi for every wNi ∈ R+, (iii) hi(wi, ·) is strictly decreasing/increasing in wNi for
every wi ∈ R+, and (iv) hi(wti,wtNi) = f̂ ti − λ̂ti for each t ∈ T . Note that (iii) and (iv) can be
ensured by (SUBS)/(COMP).





It follows by construction that: (i) Fi is concave in wi because hi(·,wNi) is strictly decreasing
in each wNi and (ii) f̂ ti − λ̂ti ∈ ∂F ti (wti,wt−i) ∀t ∈ T . Each (Fi)i∈N is defined accordingly.
52
Submodularity (supermodularity) of Pti — We must check that, given the definitions above,
Pti is indeed submodular (supermodular) in Pti. The partial derivative of Pti is given as
∂
∂wi
Pti(wi,w−i) = 0 − ei ·
(
gt,Springi + G(W − rt)
)
+ hi(wi,wNi) (A.8)
(which exists a.e. since Pti is absolutely continuous in wi). Note that G is slowly changing
in wNi by assumption. Consequently, because hi is decreasing (increasing) in wNi , ∂∂wiPti is
decreasing (increasing) in wNi . This means thatPti is submodular (supermodular) in (wi,wNi).
Optimizing net-present value — Consider i’s net-present value. By construction, Pti is
concave in wti since: Ri is concave, −Cti is concave in wti as G(·) is a nondecreasing function,
and Fi(·,wtNi) is concave in wti for each wtNi . Consequently, it follows from Theorem 3(ii) that
wti solves maxxi∈Wi Pi(xi,wt−i) if and only if 0 ∈ ∂Pti(wti,wt−i). This holds if
0 −
(
gt,Springi + G(W t − rt) + 0
)
+
∈ Fi(wti ,wt−i)︷ ︸︸ ︷
f̂ ti − λ̂ti = 0
⇐⇒ f̂ ti − λ̂ti − gt,Springi = G(W t − rt),
(A.9)
where the latter equation in (A.9) is ensured by (CGD). Hence, wti solves maxxi∈Wi Pi(xi,wt−i)
by Theorem 3. Q.E.D.
B. Instrumental variables
In order to estimate (6,8) robustly, we rely on the following assumptions (for notation: IN
is the N-by-N identity matrix).
Assumption 2. In the regression model (6,8):
(A1.1) The individual-time innovations (νti)(i,t)∈N×T are i.i.d. with finite absolute 4 + δν
moments for some δν > 0. Furthermore, E[νti] = 0 and E[(ν
t
i)
2] = σ2ν > 0.
(A1.2) The matrices (IN − βNA) and (IN − ρB) are non-singular.
Assumption (A1.1) ensures that individual innovations are well-behaved. Assumption
(A1.2) is a mild condition in our setting and ensures that the matrix of strategic interactions
is also well-behaved for estimation purposes. See Kapoor et al. (2007), Baltagi (2008),
Bramoulle et al. (2009), and Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2011) who also make such assumptions.
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B.1. Derivation of IVs
Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2011) derived the ideal set of IVs for estimating (7,8). To present
















We can write the regression model compactly by stacking the explanatory and control vari-
ables accordingly:
w = INTα + βNw +XΨ +γ + u
u = ρu + ν
(B.1)
where INT is an identify matrix of size (N · T ) × (N · T ). Denoting ιT as a vector of ones
of length T and ⊗ as the Kronecker product:  = IT ⊗A is the stacked strategic network,
 = ιT ⊗ D is the stacked individual controls matrix, and  = IT ⊗ B is the stacked
disturbance matrix. The remaining variables—namely α, X , γ, u, and ν—are ordered as
w. Note thatX collects both xti and yt terms, andΨ collects (ψ,φ).
Next, we introduce a standard within transformation matrix to normalize (B.1) (see, e.g.,





⊗ IN as the standard within transformation matrix such that, for
any matrix  of size (N · T ) × (N · T ), Q0 results in a matrix such that the mean of every
row is zero:







Q0w = βNQ0w +Q0Xβ +Q0u
Q0u = ρQ0u +Q0ν
(B.2)
where Q0 removes time-invariant elements including α and . This equation is what we
ultimately estimate, since it retains the key variable of interest, βN , with fewer terms to handle.
Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2011) show that the ideal set of IVs for estimating (B.2) is given
byQ0G0 whereG0 contains a subset of linearly independent columns of[




The interpretation is as follows. Consider i’s neighbors, Ni. X represents i’s individual
attributes;X represents i’s neighbors’ attributes;2X represents i’s neighbors’ neighbors’
attributes; etc. Each are exogenous from the perspective of farmer i. In addition, because
behaviors are assumed to be networked: X explains i’s behavior, which in turn influences
Ni’s behavior; X explains Ni’s behavior; 2X explains Ni’s neighbors’ behavior, which
in turn influences Ni’s behavior, etc. Put another way, the network itself allows us to use
farmers’ attributes as exogenous IVs to explain behavior in different parts of the network.
With Assumption 2 and an additional asymptotic assumption common in the spatial
panel data literature,24 the estimation procedure proposed by Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2011) is
consistent and asymptotically normal (we refer the interested to details therein). We follow
this procedure to formulate our results in the main text.
C. Robustness checks
C.1. Revealed preferences on different network structures
In this appendix section, we subject our revealed preference test results from Section 4 to
two robustness checks.
The first concerns network structure, where we ask: are our revealed preference test
results from Section 4 robust to different network structures? The second concerns viewing
our revealed preferences results at the population vs. individual level, where we ask: are
all farmers’ pumping decisions explained by strategic complements, or are decisions better
characterized by a mix of substitutes and complements? In other words, we are interested
in disaggregating our main findings from Section 4 from the population perspective to the
individual-level perspective.
We address both robustness questions by taking an approach similar to Section 5. Infor-
mally, we define a set of possible networks which we assume contains at least one network
that represents true strategic interaction in the UBB/URD. We then randomly sample from
this set, and we utilize these networks to calculate how often farmer i + Ni pass the GW
program with strategic substitutes/complements. With enough samples, we then have an
estimation of the probability of finding a network structure such that groundwater pumping
decisions by i +Ni are strategic substitutes/complements.
We now define this measuremore formally. As defined in Section 5, we say thatN ⊆ RNT+
is the set of feasible networks if it contains every A ∈ RNT+ such that: (i) Aii = 0, or no
24In particular, we require Assumption 3.3 from Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2011). Other versions of this
assumption can be found in Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999) and Kapoor et al. (2007).
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Farmer-level acceptance rates of the
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Figure C.5: Histogram distributions of farmer-level passing rates of the GW program with strategic substi-
tutes/complements in the (a) Upper Republican District and (b) Upper Big Blue District. The farmer-level
acceptance rate = Prob[ randomly sampling a network from N such that i + Ni pass the respective GW
program]; see Section 5.4 for the definition of N .
farmer strategically affects him/herself, (ii) Ai j > 0 only if i and j are less than 5 miles
apart, depending on the case, (that is, only neighbors induce strategic interaction effects), (iii)
Ai j = Aik for any j and k with non-zero weights, or neighbors strategically affect i equally,
and (iv)A is row normalized. In other words, N is the set of all possible networks such that
neighbors are less than five miles away. In what follows, we assume that at least one network
in N represents true strategic interaction in the UBB/URD.
For each farmer i ∈ N , we define ρS UBSi in the following way:
ρS UBSi = Probi
A ∈ N : farmers {i} ∪ { j ∈ N : Ai j = 1} pass theGW program with strategic substitutes
 .
In other words, ρS UBSi is the probability of finding a network structure such that i +Ni pass
the GW program with strategic substitutes. We can define a measure for i passing the GW
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program with strategic complements similarly:
ρCOMPi = Probi
A ∈ N : farmers {i} ∪ { j ∈ N : Ai j = 1} pass theGW program with strategic complements
 .
We estimate ρS UBSi and ρ
COMP
i for each farmer in the UBB and URD by sampling 1, 000
networks.
We report results in Figure C.5, which point to two findings that support those in the
main text. First, we find that strategic complements characterizes groundwater pumping
better than strategic substitutes for every farmer in the UBB (Figure C.5(b)) and most farmers
in the URD (Figure C.5(c)). This observation is particularly strong for the UBB: farmers’
acceptance rates of the GW program with strategic complements cluster around 0.7, whereas
acceptance rates for the strategic substitutes analog clusters around zero. Second, we find that
strategic complements explains behavior in the UBB better than the URD. The latter seems to
suggest, at this farmer-level perspective, that individual-level behavior is better characterized
by a mix of strategic substitutes and complements. But in the UBB, this ambiguity is absent.
These findings are consistent with the stronger trends we observe in the UBB in Tables 2
and 3 vs. the trends we observe in the URD in Tables C.8 and C.9.
C.2. Strategic interactions on different network structures
In Section 5, we estimated strategic interaction by assuming that neighbors were less
than 5 miles away. Our reasoning behind the ‘5 miles’ assumption to subsume the local
drawdown network from Section 4 while also permitting interactions beyond those captured
by game-theoretic assumptions.
In this section, we explore what happens when we weaken (strengthen) the ‘5 mile’ as-
sumption by increasing (decreasing) this distance. We suppose that neighbors may come
from less than {1, 3, 10, 20} miles away. {1, 3} are distances that get closer to the local
drawdown networks. {10, 20} considerably increase the space of possible network configura-
tions, thereby increasing the likelihood of drawing networks that are consistent with strategic
substitutes. For each case, we utilize the same test procedure as outlined in Section 5.
We report results in Table C.6 (we re-report the 5 miles case for the sake of comparison).
This table shows that the results reported in the main text are robust to different ways of
defining neighborhoods. Firstly, as in the 5 mile case, we evidence that the distribution
of βN − 2SE < 0 follows a normal distribution. Secondly, for each case {1, 3, 10, 20}, we
find that the probability of drawing networks that result in negative strategic interactions (or
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Table C.6: Hypothesis test results forH ′0 vs. H
′
A .
Hypothesis test results for H ′0 vs. H
′
A
N(µ, σ2) KS p-value p-value for H ′0 vs. H ′A
Neighs ≤ 1 mile (0.072, 0.009) 0.70 <0.001
Neighs ≤ 3 miles (0.234, 0.014) 0.70 <0.001
Neighs ≤ 5 miles (0.351, 0.015) 0.70 <0.001
Neighs ≤ 10 miles (0.434, 0.013) 0.69 <0.001
Neighs ≤ 20 miles (0.29, 0.009) 0.69 <0.001
βN − 2SE < 0) is statistically negligible. This means that we reject the null hypothesis H ′0
based on strong evidence for positive strategic interactions.
In Table C.7, we also report the aggregated results of each regression. As in the 5 mile
case, we find that strategic interactions is the strongest predictor of groundwater-usage.
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Table C.7: Micro-level regressions on UBB data. Number of observations = 97,160. {1, 3, 5, 10, 20} mile(s)
corresponds to neighborhood sizes as in Figure 4. Coefficients of control variables are normalized such that
β =% waterti / +1SD variable.
Dependent variable: Log (Waterti)
(1 mile) (3 miles) (5 miles) (10 miles) (20 miles)
Strategic interaction effects
Log(Neighbors’ waterti) 0.095
∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
Groundwater controls
Spring GWti −0.063∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Spring GWti − Fall GWt−1i 0.059∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
UBB-wide time-level controls
Spot market pricet 0.027∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Electricityt −0.172∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Land rental ratesti 0.16
∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Raint −0.242∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.163∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Temperaturet −0.156∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.01)
Farmer-level and time-level controls
(Temp.)×(Rain)t −0.078∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
(Land-size)×(Rain)ti −0.017∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(Land-size)×(Temp.)ti −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(Well depth)×(Rain)ti −0.011∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(Well depth)×(Temp.)ti 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(Land-size)×(Rain)×(Temp.)ti −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(Well depth)×(Rain)×(Temp.)ti −0.019∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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TableC.8: UpperRepublicanDistrict—Acceptance rates of theGWprogramwith (Panel A) strategic substitutes
and (Panel B) strategic complements (sub-sample = 1,000).
Panel A – Substitutes Number of farmers (N)
2 3 4 5 6 8
Years (T ) T = 2 0.79 0.76 0.67 0.64 0.59 0.54
T = 3 0.58 0.47 0.43 0.33 0.28 0.23
T = 4 0.41 0.30 0.21 0.15 0.10 0.05
T = 5 0.27 0.19 0.15 0.09 0.06 0.02
T = 6 0.25 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.03 0
T = 8 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.01 0 0
Panel B – Complements Number of farmers (N)
2 3 4 5 6 8
Years (T ) T = 2 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.74 0.70 0.62
T = 3 0.72 0.63 0.54 0.46 0.38 0.30
T = 4 0.61 0.42 0.31 0.21 0.14 0.09
T = 5 0.48 0.26 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.02
T = 6 0.31 0.17 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01
T = 8 0.18 0.07 0.01 0.01 0 0
60
Table C.9: Upper Republican District — Selten and Krischker’s (1983) measure of predictive success of the
GW program with (Panel A) strategic substitutes and (Panel B) strategic complements (sub-sample = 1,000).
Panel A – Strategic substitutes Number of farmers (N)
2 3 4 5 6 8
Years (T ) T = 2 −0.09 −0.09 −0.11 −0.06 −0.04 0.03
T = 3 −0.14 −0.16 −0.08 −0.05 −0.02 0.06
T = 4 −0.15 −0.11 −0.07 −0.05 0 0
T = 5 −0.19 −0.09 −0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
T = 6 −0.07 −0.04 −0.01 0.01 0.01 0
T = 8 −0.05 −0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0
Panel B – Strategic complements Number of farmers (N)
2 3 4 5 6 8
Years (T ) T = 2 0.1 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.33 0.34
T = 3 0.16 0.29 0.34 0.33 0.3 0.27
T = 4 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.09
T = 5 0.25 0.18 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.02
T = 6 0.16 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01
T = 8 0.13 0.06 0.01 0.01 0 0
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